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FINDING THE LOST INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE
Jeffrey Omar Usman∗
Though their quarry is shrouded in mystery, 1 and indeed sometimes thought
to be only a creature of myth or legend, 2 a number of judges, both those acting
alone 3 and those concentrated in groups, 4 claim to have seen an involuntary public
figure cross their paths. Descriptions have been offered, and those descriptions
have been dutifully reported. 5 It is not clear though that the judges saw either the
same thing or the same thing from the same angle. 6
∗ © 2014 Jeffrey Omar Usman. Assistant Professor of Law, Belmont University
School of Law. L.L.M., Harvard Law School; J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School;
B.A., Georgetown University. I offer my appreciation to Christine Davis, Brett Knight, and
Nate Lykins for their excellent assistance and for the able and skillful editorial aide
provided by the members of the Utah Law Review most especially Mark Capone, Larissa
Lee, and Christopher Mitchell. My thanks as always to Elizabeth Usman and Emmett
Usman.
1
See Susan M. Gilles, From Baseball Parks to the Public Arena: Assumption of the
Risk in Tort Law and Constitutional Libel Law, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 231, 270 (2002)
(recognizing “the confusion surrounding that near-mythical plaintiff, the ‘involuntary
public figure’”); 3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
§ 23:4, at 23-69 (2014) (stating the U.S. Supreme Court’s reference in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. to involuntary public figures “has generated much confusion”); J. Wilson
Parker, Free Expression and the Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. REV. 483, 546 n.314
(1985) (“The Court’s confusion in Gertz became evident in its attempted application of the
Gertz rule to other involuntary public figures.”); Nat Stern, Unresolved Antitheses of the
Limited Public Figure Doctrine, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1027, 1096 (1996) (indicating that “the
potency of the involuntary public figure doctrine remain[s] uncertain”); see also Rosanova
v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (observing that “[d]efining
public figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall”).
2
See Schultz v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 468 F. Supp. 551, 559 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(indicating that the continuing vitality of the involuntary public figure has been called into
question); LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY & R. GEORGE WRIGHT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 81 (2004) (noting that “the
lower courts have split on how to define involuntary public figures and, indeed, whether
the category even continues to exist”); 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2:33
(2d ed. 2014) (expressing skepticism about the existence of involuntary public figures).
3
See, e.g., Zupnik v. Associated Press, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 70, 73 (D. Conn. 1998);
Foretich v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1099, 1108 (D.D.C. 1991);
Price v. Chi. Magazine, No. 86 C 8161, 1988 WL 61170, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 1988).
4
See, e.g., Dameron v. Wash. Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 740–42 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Daniel
Goldreyer, Ltd. v. Dow Jones & Co., 687 N.Y.S.2d 64, 64 (App. Div. 1999); Wilson v.
Daily Gazette Co., 588 S.E.2d 197, 208–09 (W. Va. 2003).
5
See, e.g., Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742 (indicating that an otherwise private individual
became an involuntary public figure by “assum[ing] special prominence in the resolution of
[a] public question” by “bec[oming] embroiled, through no desire of his own, in [a public]
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Standing at the intersection between defamation claims and the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court
has sought to balance the interests of the states in providing redress for the harm
caused by defamation injuries arising from media coverage with the need for a
robust and vigorous press. In structuring a constitutional framework for
adjudication of defamation actions, the Supreme Court cryptically and fleetingly
referenced a category of plaintiffs—involuntary public figures. Trying to
understand and define the contours of the involuntary public figure category, or
indeed to ascertain if it even exists, has been a source of tremendous confusion and
uncertainty. The involuntary public figure has become lost. This Article seeks to
find the lost involuntary public figure.
In seeking to do so, this Article follows Aristotle’s guidance that “[i]f you
would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development.” 7 That is
controversy . . . [and] thereby became well known to the public in this one very limited
connection”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 351 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine
For Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1084 n.9 (3d Cir. 1985) (suggesting that the only persons who
would qualify as involuntary public figures are “relatives of famous people”); Wells v.
Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 540 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n involuntary public figure has pursued a
course of conduct from which it was reasonably foreseeable, at the time of the conduct, that
public interest would arise. A public controversy must have actually arisen that is related
to, although not necessarily causally linked, to the action. The involuntary public figure
must be recognized as a central figure during debate over that matter. Further, we retain
two elements of the five-part Reuber test, specifically: (1) the controversy existed prior to
the publication of the defamatory statement; and (2) the plaintiff retained public-figure
status at the time of the alleged defamation. Additionally, to the extent that an involuntary
public figure attempts self-help, the Foretich rule must apply with equal strength.” (citation
omitted)); Wilson, 588 S.E.2d at 208–09 (“[T]o prove that a plaintiff is an involuntary
public figure, the defendant must demonstrate by clear evidence that (1) the plaintiff has
become a central figure in a significant public controversy, (2) that the allegedly
defamatory statement has arisen in the course of discourse regarding the public matter, and
(3) the plaintiff has taken some action, or failed to act when action was required, in
circumstances in which a reasonable person would understand that publicity would likely
inhere.”).
6
See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, ADVANCED TORT LAW: A PROBLEM APPROACH 220
(2010) (noting that “[c]ourts have employed such a bewildering array of tests in grappling
with the elusive idea of ‘involuntary public figure’ status that it is difficult to say anything
about this category”); Joseph H. King, Jr., Deus ex Machina and the Unfulfilled Promise of
New York Times v. Sullivan: Applying the Times for All Seasons, 95 KY. L.J. 649, 672
(2006–2007) (noting the “dizzying variety of approaches” “to the involuntary public figure
subcategory [that] have been adopted by the courts”).
7
Stephanie M. Reich et al., An Introduction to the Diversity of Community
Psychology Internationally, in INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY: HISTORY AND
THEORIES 1, 5 (Stephanie M. Reich et al. eds., 2007). While differing with Aristotle with
regard to the value of philosophy, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes concurred with Aristotle
in terms of valuing history: “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” New York Trust
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). This wisdom is also reflected in the modern adage
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precisely how the discussion in this Article begins in Part I, through observation of
the beginning and development of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the
constitutional limitations imposed upon defamation actions under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Part II of the Article then briefly
sets forth the constitutional framework that the Supreme Court imposed in 1974 on
defamation actions in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 8 The Article then addresses in
Part III how the pressures of the First Amendment have eroded the structure that
Gertz built. In doing so, Part III specifically explores the expanding definition of
who constitutes a public official and what qualifies as a matter of public
controversy, the weakening of the underlying rationales for Gertz’s distinguishing
between public and private figures both in terms of access to channels of
communication and the definition of voluntariness, and the increasing force of
Justice William Brennan’s contention in Gertz, advanced in his dissenting opinion,
that there is no such thing as a private person. Part IV seeks to demonstrate that,
while First Amendment pressures have weakened the edifice created by the Gertz
structure, there is continuing value and purpose to the Gertz framework. Having
developed an understanding of the Gertz structure as it exists today, the
constitutional pressures thereupon, and continuing value thereof, Part V defines the
involuntary public figure. Part V also reflects the manner in which this
understanding of who qualifies as an involuntary public figure relieves some of the
First Amendment pressures on other categories within the Gertz framework, while
still serving the enduring purposes of Gertz’s distinguishing public from private
persons. Most notably the Article addresses how the disuse of the involuntary
public figure category has resulted in distortion of the concept of voluntariness,
which plays a critical role in classification of an individual as a public figure or
private individual.
I. THE ROAD FROM NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN TO GERTZ V. ROBERT
WELCH, INC.
While there are certainly other significant decisions,9 there are four cases,
each decided three to four years apart over the course of the decade between 1964
to 1974, that form the core of the Supreme Court’s exploration of the constitutional
constraints upon defamation actions: (1) New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 10 (2)
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 11 (3) Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 12 and (4)
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
that “[y]ou can’t know where you’re going unless you know where you’ve been.” THE
DICTIONARY OF MODERN PROVERBS 134 (Charles Clay Doyle et al. eds., 2012).
8
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
9
See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985);
Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
10
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
11
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
12
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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A. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
On March 29, 1960, the New York Times published a page-length editorial
advertisement, which had been created by civil rights leaders A. Philip Randolph
and Bayard Rustin, 13 entitled Heed Their Rising Voices. 14 The advertisement,
which listed eighty prominent endorsers, 15 was a successful appeal to raise money
to assist Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. with legal fees incurred during the civil rights
struggle. 16 The advertisement’s focus on misconduct of police officials and the
reasonable non-violent resistance of civil rights protestors was in accord with the
broader civil rights movement strategy of appealing to people’s consciences,
especially in the North, by shining a light on the extreme racism then existent in
the South. 17
Iconoclastic Alabama journalist Ray Jenkins, 18 who was one of a small
number of regular readers of the New York Times in Montgomery, 19 thought a
story on the advertisement would provide insight for his readers into law
enforcement’s treatment of civil rights protestors. 20 In Jenkins’ Alabama Journal
story, which was published approximately a week after the advertisement in the
13
14

LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 304 (2000).
KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 331 (5th ed.

2007).
15

The list of signatories and endorsers of the advertisement included ministers,
musicians, athletes, and a wide variety of other well-known persons including former First
Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at 25.
16
POWE, supra note 13, at 304–05.
17
Anthony Lewis, The Press: Free but Not Exceptional, in REASON AND PASSION:
JUSTICE BRENNAN’S ENDURING INFLUENCE 53, 54 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard
Schwartz eds., 1997); Anthony Lewis, The Sullivan Decision, 1 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 135,
136–37 (2004). See generally Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 141–49 (1994) (explaining how civil rights leaders in
the early 1960s directed their efforts to enlisting northern whites to the civil rights cause).
“[C]ivil rights leaders made a virtue out of the necessity of raising money to defend King,”
and they accomplished this by “bring[ing] attention to King’s plight through a full-page
ad . . . that would also call attention to the sit-in movement generally and events in
Montgomery specifically.” KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V.
SULLIVAN: CIVIL RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS 15–16 (2011).
18
Jenkins proved to be a source of irritation over the years to Alabama’s political
establishment. See generally RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND: THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND
THE FRACTURING OF AMERICA 79 (2008) (describing Jenkins’s role in Alabama’s politics).
19
ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 9 (1991). At the time of the article’s publication, there were only 394 issues
of the New York Times that were printed for individual subscribers or newsstands in the
entire State of Alabama. Id.; KERMIT L. HALL & JOHN J. PATRICK, THE PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS THAT SHAPED AMERICA 143 (2006).
20
See HALL & PATRICK, supra note 19, at 143. Jenkins also appreciated the interest
that a story involving Dr. King, who was both revered and hated in Montgomery, would
generate, as well as the interest attached to learning about the prominent signatories and
endorsers. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 17, at 23.
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New York Times, he noted that a number of factual errors appeared in the
advertisement, but that the errors were minor in nature. 21 These minor errors would
prove extremely problematic for the New York Times and the four Alabama
ministers listed as endorsers of the advertisement: Reverends Ralph Abernathy,
Joseph Lowery, S.S. Seay, Sr., and Fred Shuttlesworth. 22
Responding to Jenkins’ story, Montgomery Advertiser editor Grover Hall, Jr.
brought his editorial page to a full pitch fury against the New York Times. 23 The
advertisement had struck a particularly sensitive cord with Hall, whose southern
pride and irritation at what he perceived as hypocritical blindness of the press
toward racial tensions in northern cities were pronounced. 24 In his bombastic
editorial entitled Lies, Lies, Lies, Hall roared,
[t]here are voluntary liars, there are involuntary liars. Both kinds of liars
contributed to the crude slanders against Montgomery . . . in a full-page
advertisement in the New York Times . . . . Lies, lies, lies . . . and
possibly willful ones on the part of the fund-raising novelist who wrote
those lines to prey on the credulity, self-righteousness and
misinformation of northern citizens. 25
Taking offense against the advertisement on behalf of the entire State of Alabama,
Hall “invited everyone in Alabama to sue the New York Times.” 26
Montgomery Police Commissioner L.B. Sullivan did not need
encouragement. He believed the advertisement maligned him personally and the
Montgomery police officers he supervised. 27 The entire Alabama political
establishment from the Governor downward also bristled at criticism from northern
newspapers at their handling of civil rights protestors and had been looking for an
opportunity to strike at the northern press. 28 The Attorney General of Alabama
advised that the “proper public officials” should file multimillion-dollar lawsuits
against the New York Times. 29 Sullivan, who was already irked by the press, even
local media such as Hall, 30 struck back. 31
21

SUSAN DUDLEY GOLD, NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
OR LIBEL? 19 (2007).
22
See FRED D. GRAY, BUS RIDE TO JUSTICE: CHANGING THE SYSTEM BY THE SYSTEM
156–59 (rev. ed. 2013).
23
LEWIS, supra note 19, at 10–11.
24
Id. at 11.
25
Id.
26
GOLD, supra note 21, at 19.
27
Id. at 19–21.
28
Id. at 22–24.
29
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS IN AMERICA 82 (1991).
30
Sullivan was regularly engaged in struggles with the press and even Hall was too
progressive for Sullivan’s tastes. As an illustration, in 1960 a group of students from
Alabama State College demanded to be seated and served in a state cafeteria that was open
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Sullivan brought suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Alabama
against the New York Times Company and the four Alabama ministers who had
been endorsers. 32 Alabama state courts, through both judges and juries, had long
been complicit in the maintenance of white supremacy within the State of
Alabama. 33 It was to those state courts that the Alabama political establishment
turned to take action against their political adversaries. 34 The New York Times was
easily perceived by white Alabamians of the era as among the “outside agitators”
against whom their animus was directed. 35
The inclusion of the Alabama ministers tactically eliminated diversity
jurisdiction as a route for removing the case to federal court, but their inclusion
was not merely tactical. 36 The ministers were also a target of the white political
establishment. 37 Having been locked in a social, political, and legal struggle with
Alabama’s white supremacy power structure, Reverends Abernathy, Lowery, Seay,
to the public. STEPHAN LESHER, GEORGE WALLACE: AMERICAN POPULIST 145–46 (1994).
On the basis of their race, the students were denied seating; they left peaceably. Id.
Nevertheless, Governor John Patterson demanded College President H. Council Trenholm
expel the students and threatened the loss of state funding for failure to do so. Id. Trenholm
acceded to the demands. Id. at 146. Rumors of sit-ins to protest the Governor’s demand and
Trenholm’s acquiescence spread throughout Montgomery. Id. While the rumored sit-ins
did not materialize, violent white supremacists assaulted African Americans in
Montgomery in response to the rumors. Id. In a particularly disturbing incident, an African
American woman was beaten severely with a baseball bat. Id. A photograph of the attacker,
who was identified in the newspaper, was published in the Montgomery Advertiser. Id. The
story therein indicated that the police had witnessed the attack and done nothing. Id.
Sullivan insisted the attacker, despite the Montgomery Advertiser story, could not be
identified from the photograph and denounced the Alabama State College students for
creating tensions and the newspaper for publishing the photograph. Id. Hall indicated that
Sullivan’s problem is “‘not a photographer with a camera’ but a ‘white man with a baseball
bat.’” Id.
31
HALL & PATRICK, supra note 19, at 143.
32
LEWIS, supra note 19, at 12.
33
See generally Robert J. Norrell, Law in a White Man’s Democracy: A History of the
Alabama State Judiciary, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 135 (2001) (exploring the long and troubling
history of the Alabama judiciary’s involvement in maintaining white supremacy); HASAN
KWAME JEFFRIES, BLOODY LOWNDES: CIVIL RIGHTS AND BLACK POWER IN ALABAMA’S
BLACK BELT 133 (2009) (addressing racial prejudice in Alabama’s juries); Michael J.
Klarman, Is the Supreme Court Sometimes Irrelevant? Race and the Southern Criminal
Justice System in the 1940s, 89 J. AM. HIST. 119 (2002) (discussing the minimal effects of
Supreme Court rulings on civil rights as result, in part, of resistance from Southern judges
and juries).
34
JAMES L. AUCOIN, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM 68
(2005); Garrett Epps, The Other Sullivan Case, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 783, 784–85
(2005).
35
JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 429
(2006).
36
See Epps, supra note 34, at 784–86.
37
Id.
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and Shuttlesworth were perceived as in-state agitators. 38 Sullivan sought $500,000
in damages from each of the defendants. 39 This was not the first time Alabama’s
political apparatus had made active use of the legal system to attack the civil rights
movement. 40 As a practical matter, legal costs had proven to be a persistent
underlying problem for the movement and now Sullivan was seeking a judgment
that would be impossible to pay. 41 The defamation suit was an opportunity to
deliver a crushing blow.
In terms of the legal theory and facts underlying his defamation action,
Sullivan specifically raised objections to assertions advanced in the third and sixth
paragraphs of the advertisement, 42 which said,
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang “My Country, ’Tis of
Thee” on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school,
and truck-loads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the
Alabama State College Campus. When the entire student body protested
to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission. . . .
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King’s
peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his
home almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person.
They have arrested him seven times—for “speeding,” “loitering” and
similar “offenses.” And now they have charged him with “perjury” . . .
under which they could imprison him for ten years. Obviously, their real
purpose is to remove him physically as the leader to whom the students
and millions of others—look for guidance and support, and thereby to
intimidate all leaders who may rise in the South. Their strategy is to
behead this affirmative movement, and thus to demoralize [African]
Americans and weaken their will to struggle. The defense of Martin
Luther King, spiritual leader of the student sit-in movement, clearly,
therefore, is an integral part of the total struggle for freedom in the
South. 43
As Jenkins’s had noted in his Alabama Journal story, the advertisement was
less than a work of precision. 44 Among the errors therein, the campus dining hall
had not been padlocked on any occasion, the police had a significant presence near
the campus but did not “ring” the campus and had not been called to the campus in
response to the demonstration at the capitol steps, the students had sung a different

38

See id.
HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 17, at 31–32.
40
Id. at 15.
41
PETER E. KANE, ERRORS, LIES, AND LIBEL 10 (1992).
42
LEWIS, supra note 19, at 12.
43
Heed Their Rising Voices, supra note 15.
44
GOLD, supra note 21, at 18–19.
39
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song, 45 and the police had arrested Dr. King four not seven times. 46 Precious little
attention was given to the connection between the advertisement’s content and
Sullivan or to the advertisement having injured his reputation. 47 Furthermore, the
ministers testified without contradiction that they had not seen the advertisement
much less authorized use of their names as endorsers. 48 In fact, the ministers only
discovered their names were listed on the advertisement, their names having been
added to the advertisement as endorsers without the ministers’ knowledge or
consent, 49 through Sullivan’s filing of suit against them. 50 Nevertheless, the allwhite Montgomery jury lashed out at the ministers and the New York Times,
returning $500,000 verdicts against each of the defendants. 51 Moving forward with
enforcement of the decision, Sullivan and the Alabama judiciary would prove
particularly vindictive towards the ministers, seizing and levying their property for
payment of the judgment without following standard procedures in awaiting
resolution of the case on appeal. 52
The jury’s decision shone a path for southern officials to bring the northern
press to heel. In the eighteen months that immediately followed the verdict,
southern political officials would file defamation actions seeking more than three
hundred million dollars in damages related to news coverage of the civil rights
movement. 53 The lawsuits targeted journalists who were reporting upon the civil
rights movement. 54 While New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan was pending before the
Supreme Court, the New York Times Company “pulled its reporters out of
Alabama, achieving precisely what the state had hoped—an end to national
attention to its racial policies, at least in the pages of the Times.” 55 That the
defamation lawsuits were curtailing reporting by the press on the civil rights
movement in the South was far from a hidden consequence. 56 A headline in the
Montgomery Advertiser boldly celebrated “State Finds Formidable Legal Club to
45

The advertisement indicated the students were singing My Country ‘Tis of Thee. Id.
at 18. The students were actually singing The Star-Spangled Banner. Id.
46
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 259 (1964).
47
Reflecting on the case, Justice Hugo Black of Alabama quipped “that if any of
Sullivan’s friends in Montgomery believed he had ordered the repression of the civil rights
movement described in the New York Times advertisement, his ‘political, social and
financial prestige has likely been enhanced.’” LEWIS, supra note 19, at 225.
48
Id. at 12.
49
HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 17, at 15–18 (discussing how the four ministers’
names came to be included in the advertisement without their knowledge or consent).
50
TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–63,
at 289 (1988).
51
HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 17, at 31–33, 68.
52
Id. at 88; ALFRED H. KNIGHT, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: THE PEOPLE AND CASES THAT
HAVE SHAPED OUR SOCIETY, FROM KING ALFRED TO RODNEY KING 228 (1996); Epps,
supra note 34, at 785.
53
KNIGHT, supra note 52, at 229.
54
AUCOIN, supra note 34, at 68.
55
NEWTON, supra note 35, at 429.
56
KNIGHT, supra note 52, at 229.
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Swing at Out-of-State Press.” 57 The Alabama Journal observed that as a result of
the verdict its northern press counterparts might “re-survey . . . their habit of
permitting anything detrimental to the south and its people to appear in their
columns.” 58 In their brief before the Supreme Court, the ministers perfectly
described the use of libel suits as a political tool in support of white supremacy.
Such suits are “part of a concerted, calculated program to carry out a policy of
punishing, intimidating and silencing all who criticize and seek to change
Alabama’s notorious political system of enforced segregation.” 59
While in retrospect the unconstitutionality of Alabama’s strict liability
approach to defamation is clear,60 it was far from that at the time. 61 On appeal, the
Alabama Supreme Court did not provide any succor to the New York Times. 62 To
the contrary, the Court noted that the crux of the lawsuit involved libelous portions
of the advertisement and that “[t]he First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does
not protect libelous publications.” 63 The Alabama Supreme Court, not surprisingly,
cited, among others cases, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire. 64 Therein, the Court had indicated that
[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
57

Id.
DOUGLAS M. FRALEIGH & JOSEPH S. TUMAN, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 172 (2011).
59
Brief for Petitioners at 29, Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1963) (No. 40),
1963 WL 105893, at *29.
60
Judge Alex Kozinski has presented a rendering of the stark consequences of a
different conclusion:
58

If successful, the lawsuits would effectively ring down the curtain on conditions
of blacks in the South, for every story and every advertisement commenting on
those conditions would expose the media sources to liability. Worse, if L. B.
Sullivan—a small-town official from the heart of Dixie—could intimidate The
New York Times, the media in this country would become as effective as a
toothless guard dog.
Alex Kozinski, The Bulwark Brennan Built, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov./Dec. 1991, at
85, 85. Professor Norman Rosenberg has noted that the libel suits “seemed about to inhibit
political discussion even more seriously than had the infamous Sedition Act of 1798.”
NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LAW OF LIBEL 236 (1986).
61
See KNIGHT, supra note 52, at 229–30.
62
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1962).
63
Id. at 40.
64
Id. (citing Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Times Film Corp. v.
City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283
U.S. 697 (1931)).
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any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words—those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 65
Nor did this decision reflect a new approach to the intersection of a free press
with libel. To the contrary, William Blackstone’s Commentaries had provided that
“where blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous
libels are punished by the English law . . . the liberty of the press, properly
understood, is by no means infringed or violated.” 66 Though the legal revolution
that the Warren Court was generating should have perhaps provided him with
pause, 67 Sullivan’s attorney, M. Roland Nachman, Jr., 68 was understandably
confident of his chances of prevailing before the high court. He said, “[t]he only
way the Court could decide against me was to change one hundred years or more
of libel law.” 69
That is precisely what the U.S. Supreme Court would do. For the Court, the
advertisement being libelous under state tort law was not controlling; rather, the
Court glided past the heart of Sullivan’s argument, concluding that “libel can claim
no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations.” 70 Distinguishing prior
precedents that suggested the opposite, the Court noted those prior cases did not
involve application of libel suits “to impose sanctions upon expression critical of
the official conduct of public officials.” 71 The Court rejected the foundation of
Sullivan’s argument that libelous speech was not subject to constitutional scrutiny
and concluded instead that defamation actions would have to be “measured by
standards that satisfy the First Amendment.” 72
In weighing Alabama’s state defamation law against First Amendment
standards, neither the inclusion of false information in the advertisement nor the
65

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151 (emphasis omitted).
67
See generally Jeffrey Omar Usman, Constitutional Constraints on Retroactive Civil
Legislation: The Hollow Promises of the Federal Constitution and Unrealized Potential of
State Constitutions, 14 NEV. L.J. 63, 80–81 (2013) (noting that the Warren Court
fundamentally changed the legal landscape surrounding the United States Constitution
through a “jurisprudential revolution” that “breathed [life] into the Federal Constitution”
and “sucked [life] out of the state constitutions”).
68
Nachman, a Montgomery attorney and a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard
Law School, was one of the small numbers of Alabamians who subscribed to the New York
Times. LEWIS, supra note 19, at 111.
69
POWE, supra note 29, at 87.
70
New York Times Co., v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
71
Id. at 268.
72
Id. at 269.
66
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availability of truth as a defense was sufficient to render the verdict sustainable. 73
The Court concluded that requiring critics of public officials to guarantee the truth
of all their statements under the looming threat of a libel judgment would dampen
the vigor and limit the variety of public debate. 74 In order to protect public
discourse about the conduct of public officials, the Court determined that an error,
even one resulting from negligence, should not be sufficient to recover tort
damages. 75 The Court recognized that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free
debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’” 76 Quoting John Stuart Mill, the
Court observed that “[e]ven a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable
contribution to public debate, since it brings about ‘the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.’” 77
To maintain the necessary breathing room for protecting public debate, the
Court determined that a public official could not recover damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his or her official conduct without proof that the statement
was made with “actual malice.” 78 To demonstrate actual malice, claimants would
henceforth need to show the statement was made “with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” 79
The Court’s holding in New York Times was expressly tied to First
Amendment limits on defamation actions brought by public officials 80 regarding
their official conduct, and the Court’s reasoning was intertwined with speech
regarding governance. 81 Nevertheless, expansion of this First Amendment
protection seemed to be on the horizon. The Court’s declaration in New York Times
that the constitutional safeguard of the First Amendment “was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people” pointed to constitutional protections relating to
defamation actions involving persons other than public officials. 82

73

Id. at 268–69.
Id. at 270–71, 279.
75
See id. at 268–69.
76
Id. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
77
Id. at 279 n.19 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (R.B. McCallum ed.,
Oxford, B. Blackwell 1946) (1859)).
78
Id. at 279–80.
79
Id. at 280.
80
Having determined that Sullivan, as the Montgomery County Commissioner in
charge of the police, clearly qualified as a public official, the Court did not find it necessary
to further address who qualifies as a public official. Id. at 283 n.23. The Court provided
additional insight in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). Therein, the Court
indicated that “the ‘public official’ designation applies at the very least to those among the
hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.” Id.
81
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 264, 268–78.
82
Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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B. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
That extension of the actual malice standard beyond speech related to public
officials occurred in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, which addresses two
consolidated cases—one involving a former University of Georgia football coach
and the other a retired Army General. 83 As for the former, the tenure of James
Wallace Butts, Jr., better known as Wally Butts, as the head football coach for the
University of Georgia from 1939 to 1960 was so successful that it resulted in his
posthumous enshrinement in the college football hall of fame. 84 As 1960
approached, however, Butts’s teams started to have too many losing seasons on the
field, 85 and Butts’s character defects were increasingly causing off the field image
problems for the university. 86 Though he was removed from the more visible
position of head football coach, Butts retained his position as athletic director. 87 At
the time, the Georgia athletic director was paid using private funds and was a
private employee under Georgia law rather than a state employee. 88 Because the
Supreme Court resolved the case on other grounds, it did not consider whether
Butts was truly a private employee. 89
Butts was still the Georgia athletic director on September 13, 1962 when he
telephonically crossed paths with Atlanta businessman George Burnett. 90 While
making a phone call, a telephone operator mistakenly connected Burnett into a
phone conversation between Butts and Alabama football coach Paul “Bear”
Bryant. 91 Burnett claimed the conversation involved Butts revealing insider
information to an appreciative Bryant that would be helpful for Alabama in their
upcoming game against Georgia. 92 The following weekend, Alabama annihilated
83

388 U.S. 130, 135–42 (1967); see also Norman T. Deutsch, Professor Nimmer
Meets Professor Schauer (and Others): An Analysis of “Definitional Balancing” as a
Methodology for Determining the “Visible Boundaries of the First Amendment,” 39
AKRON L. REV. 483, 525 (2006) (noting the Supreme Court’s expansion of the actual
malice standard to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts).
84
See RICHARD SCOTT, SEC FOOTBALL: 75 YEARS OF PRIDE AND PASSION 126
(2008); TONY BARNHART, ALWAYS A BULLDOG: PLAYERS, COACHES, AND FANS SHARE
THEIR PASSION FOR GEORGIA FOOTBALL 137–38 (2011).
85
VINCE J. DOOLEY & TONY BARNHART, DOOLEY: MY 40 YEARS AT GEORGIA 125
(2005) (stating that five of Butts’s last eight seasons ended with losing records).
86
RICHARD O. DAVIES & RICHARD G. ABRAM, BETTING THE LINE: SPORTS
WAGERING IN AMERICAN LIFE 107–08 (2001); ALBERT J. FIGONE, CHEATING THE SPREAD:
GAMBLERS, POINT SHAVERS, AND GAME FIXERS IN COLLEGE FOOTBALL AND BASKETBALL
75 (2012) (indicating that boosters pressured to have Butts fired in large part because of his
personal financial problems, excessive drinking at nightclubs, and sexual indiscretions with
young women, including on out-of-town trips financed at the university’s expense).
87
FIGONE, supra note 86, at 75.
88
Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 135.
89
See id. at 135 & n.2.
90
FIGONE, supra note 86, at 75.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 76.
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Georgia thirty-five to zero in the game—a margin of victory that was twice the
betting line. 93 Burnett, who had taken notes on the conversation, waited several
months before talking with University of Georgia officials.94 When he finally did
so, the University through the Georgia Attorney General’s Office conducted an
investigation that found enough cause for concern to force Butts’s resignation in
February of 1963. 95
Sportswriter Frank Graham, Jr. had gotten word from the Saturday Evening
Post of a scandal involving Butts and was investigating the matter.96 The reason
for the resignation had not yet broken in the press. 97 Like Butts, by 1960 the
Saturday Evening Post had seen better days. 98 What once had been a publishing
powerhouse aimed at Middle America and adorned with Norman Rockwell’s
artistry had grown stale and was losing market position. 99 To turn things around,
Curtis Publishing hired an energetic editor-in-chief named Clay Blair, who planned
to steer the magazine toward “sophisticated muck-racking” and “provoking
people.” 100 The Butts/Bryant story fit perfectly with the new direction of the
magazine, 101 so the magazine purchased Burnett’s cooperation for $5,000. 102
Fearing leaks from his own editors and concerned that a competitor might
scoop the Butts/Bryant story, Blair created an ad hoc publishing process that
lacked the magazine’s normal editorial oversight and review. 103 The March 23,
1963 edition of the Saturday Evening Post included the less-than-thoroughly
vetted “The Story of a College Football Fix.” 104 Within days of release of the
issue, Butts and Bryant filed suits seeking millions of dollars in damages. 105
Relying upon diversity jurisdiction, Butts filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia. 106 Whatever the truth may be, 107 the
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Id.
Id. at 77.
95
Id. at 77–78.
96
Id. at 78.
97
FRANK GRAHAM, JR., A FAREWELL TO HEROES 284 (1981).
98
KEITH DUNNAVANT, COACH: THE LIFE OF PAUL “BEAR” BRYANT 168 (rev. ed.
2005).
99
Id.
100
Id. at 168–69.
101
GRAHAM, supra note 97, at 284.
102
FIGONE, supra note 86, at 77–78.
103
DUNNAVANT, supra note 98, at 169–70.
104
FIGONE, supra note 86, at 79.
105
DUNNAVANT, supra note 98, at 170.
106
FIGONE, supra note 86, at 82.
107
James Kirby, who had been the Dean of the Ohio State University College of Law,
General Counsel of New York University, and a Professor at the University of Tennessee
College of Law, was hired as an observer of the trial by the Southeastern Conference. Id. at
77. In a book he wrote on the scandal, Kirby concludes both Butts and Bryant acted with
impropriety but that Alabama would have likely won and covered the betting line spread
anyway. JAMES KIRBY, FUMBLE: BEAR BRYANT, WALLY BUTTS, AND THE GREAT COLLEGE
94

964

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

trial itself proved to be no less of a rout than Alabama’s victory over Georgia had
been in the allegedly fixed game. 108 The jury returned a $3.6 million verdict for
Butts, which was reduced by the trial court to $460,000. 109 Shortly thereafter, the
Supreme Court released its New York Times Co. v. Sullivan decision, and the
publisher filed a motion for new trial based thereupon. 110 The district court denied
the publisher’s motion because Butts was not a public official and because the jury
could have concluded the publisher acted with reckless disregard as to whether the
article was false or not. 111 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the judgment in a divided vote. 112
The companion case involved former Army General Edwin Walker and the
Associated Press’s reporting on his role in riots at the University of Mississippi in
opposition to enforcement of court ordered integration. 113 Denied admission to the
all-white University of Mississippi on the basis of race, James Meredith
successfully challenged the University’s exclusionary policies in court. 114
Mississippi state officials, however, repeatedly refused to honor court orders
requiring his admission. 115 The Kennedy administration sought an accommodation
with Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett but was unable to reach an accord, or at
least an accord that Barnett would honor. 116 Lacking cooperation from state
authorities, the Kennedy administration assembled a force of federal marshals and
a hodgepodge of other federal officials composed of everyone from Department of
Justice attorneys and border agents to federal prison guards to ensure Meredith was
able to register and attend classes. 117 On the day before Meredith was to register,
federal officials set up a command center and camped out for the night at the
Lyceum, a legendary building on the campus, to be prepared to help Meredith
register the following morning. 118 Mistakenly believing Meredith was in the

FOOTBALL SCANDAL 189–213 (1986). A number of Bryant biographers have disagreed.
See, e.g., DUNNAVANT, supra note 98, at 170.
108
See KIRBY, supra note 107, at 91–148.
109
See FIGONE, supra note 86, at 84.
110
See id.; KIRBY, supra note 107, at 183–84.
111
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1967).
112
Id. at 139.
113
Id. at 140.
114
CHARLES W. EAGLES, THE PRICE OF DEFIANCE: JAMES MEREDITH AND THE
INTEGRATION OF OLE MISS 201–339 (2009) (discussing in detail the lengthy court battles
preceding Meredith’s admission).
115
RICHARD K. SCHER, POLITICS IN THE NEW SOUTH: REPUBLICANISM, RACE AND
LEADERSHIP IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 215 (2d ed. 1997); EAGLES, supra note 114, at
276–77 (“Determined to keep Meredith out of Ole Miss, the state’s leadership did not
know what to do except to be obstructive.”).
116
SCHER, supra note 115, at 215; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDY
AND H IS TIMES 337–39 (1978).
117
EVAN THOMAS, ROBERT KENNEDY: HIS LIFE 200 (2000).
118
Id. (“Unprepared and ignorant of local lore, the Kennedy team blundered in its
choice of a place to stand. . . . The Lyceum and the Grove were sacred ground at Ole Miss.
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Lyceum, 119 a mob of more than two thousand five hundred persons attacked
federal officials with Molotov cocktails, guns, and a bulldozer, which was turned
into makeshift battering ram to break the federal line. 120 By the time military
reinforcements arrived in the middle of the night, one hundred and sixty federal
officials had been injured, twenty-eight of them by gunfire, and two persons, a
reporter and a local resident, were dead. 121 The morning after, Meredith, who was
escorted by five thousand troops, registered for classes. 122 Enduring constant
threats and harassment, 123 Meredith lived with a federal marshal for the next two
years until he graduated in 1963, becoming the first African American graduate
from the University of Mississippi. 124
Van Savell, a young reporter who blended in well among the college students,
had been part of a team of Associated Press (AP) reporters covering the integration
of the University of Mississippi.125 In reporting on the rioting for the AP, Savell
[Nicholas] Katzenbach later realized they might as well have decided to bivouac in Robert
E. Lee’s tomb.”)
119
SCHLESINGER, supra note 116, at 322.
120
See JONATHAN ROSENBERG & ZACHERY KARABELL, KENNEDY, JOHNSON, AND THE
QUEST FOR JUSTICE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS TAPES 47 (2003); ROBERT DALLEK, AN
UNFINISHED LIFE: JOHN F. KENNEDY 1917–1963, at 516–17 (2003); THOMAS, supra note
117, at 200–04.
121
THOMAS, supra note 117, at 200.
122
SCHER, supra note 115, at 215. When asked what was to be done after the rioting
of the night before, Department of Justice attorney Nicholas Katzenbach stated, “we’re
going to register Mr. Meredith at 8 o’clock.” SCHLESINGER, supra note 116, at 325. During
the fall of 1962 at the height of the federal troops’ presence in Oxford, Mississippi (20,000
soldiers), the campus looked more like a military encampment than a university with
soldiers outnumbering students by a 5 to 1 ratio. FRANK LAMBERT, THE BATTLE OF OLE
MISS: CIVIL RIGHTS V. STATES’ RIGHTS 128 (2010).
123
MEREDITH COLEMAN MCGEE, JAMES MEREDITH: WARRIOR AND THE AMERICA
THAT CREATED HIM 71–73 (2013). Describing his experience, Meredith, who had
previously served in the military, stated, “I was not a student. I was a soldier in a war. . . .
Students threw rocks and firecrackers at me. They insulted me, but I never allowed anyone
to get close to me. . . . I considered myself engaged in a War from day one.” Id. at 72–73
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124
Id. at 71–74. Reflecting upon the entirety of the experience, Meredith wrote to
Robert Kennedy in 1963:
I am a graduate of the University of Mississippi. For this I am proud of my
Country . . . . The question always arises—was it worth the cost? . . . I believe
that I echo the feelings of most Americans when I say that “no price is too high
to pay for freedom of person, equality of opportunity, and human dignity.”
Letter from J. H. Meredith to Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, United States of
America (Sept. 5, 1963), available at http://rfkcenter.org/james-meredith-17, archived at
http://perma.cc/86H7-NQXH.
125
Nancy Benac, A Fight Is What This Is, in BREAKING NEWS: HOW THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS HAS COVERED WAR, PEACE, AND EVERYTHING ELSE 90, 95 (2007).
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indicated that Walker, who was among the rioters, had “assumed command” of the
crowd and “led a charge of students against federal marshals.” 126 He added that
Walker had climbed on a monument, exhorting the rioting crowd with the
admonition “[d]on’t let up now. . . . You must be prepared for possible death. If
you are not, go home now.” 127 After the rioting, Walker was arrested and charged
with, among other offenses, insurrection against the United States—these charges
were later dropped. 128
Walker was not new to the spotlight. His military career had ended in
controversy over his attempts to indoctrinate soldiers under his command using
controversial voter-rating guides and materials from the John Birch Society. 129
Even before the rioting, Walker had assumed a leadership position in the
opposition to integration of the University of Mississippi. 130 In radio addresses, he
called upon southerners to draw the line, saying “[i]t is time to move. We have
talked, listened and been pushed around far too much for the anti-Christ Supreme
Court. Bring your flags, your tents, and your skillets.” 131
Walker filed fifteen libel suits against the AP, specifically selecting southern
towns in which newspapers carried the story and in which he thought a
sympathetic jury pool could be found. 132 He sought more than $33 million in
damages. 133 Walker conceded that he had been present and spoken to the students,
but he insisted he counseled restraint, did not exercise any control over the crowd,

126

Id. at 95–96 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 95 (omission in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
128
Id. at 96.
129
STEVEN E. ATKINS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN MODERN
AMERICAN HISTORY 186 (2011). Walker, who had served with distinction in World War II
and the Korean War, had also been assigned by President Eisenhower as the commanding
officer to direct the military in aiding the integration of Central High School in Little Rock,
Arkansas. Id. Walker only performed the latter function after his Commander-in-Chief
refused to allow him to resign his commission. Id. The beginning of the end of Walker’s
military career occurred with the publication of a 1961 article in Overseas Weekly that
noted that Walker was using John Birch Society materials as anti-communist indoctrination
material. SARA DIAMOND, ROADS TO DOMINION: RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS AND
POLITICAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 57 (1995). While the Pentagon did have an anticommunist indoctrination education initiative, the John Birch Society materials confused
the American Left with Soviet Communists. Id. The removal of Walker would become a
major point of confrontation between the American right and left. Id. at 57–58; see also
DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND GRASSROOTS CONSERVATISM: A
WOMAN’S CRUSADE 101–02 (2005); DAVID TALBOT, BROTHERS: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
THE KENNEDY YEARS 71–72 (2007); Editorial, Fair Play for Gen. Walker, LIFE, Oct. 6,
1961, at 4.
130
Benac, supra note 125, at 96.
131
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id.
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Id.
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and did not lead a charge against federal marshals. 134 The AP lost the defamation
case Walker filed in Fort Worth, Texas, and the jury returned a verdict for
$800,000, which was reduced to $500,000 by the trial court. 135 The trial court
explicitly declined to apply the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan standard; however,
the court noted that if the actual malice standard had been applicable, it would
have entered a directed verdict for the AP. 136 The Texas Court of Appeals
affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court declined to review the decision. 137
Addressing Butts’s and Walker’s appeals, the primary issue before the Court
was whether the constitutional safeguards afforded speech regarding public
officials would be extended to those who did not work for the government. For
reasons addressed in more detail in Part III.B below, the U.S. Supreme Court
extended the actual malice standard to public figures. 138 Though the Court
concluded Butts had made a sufficient showing of wanton and reckless
indifference to support a finding of actual malice, the Court’s application of the
heightened standard required that the judgment for Walker be set aside. 139 None of
the justices, however, provided bright line rules for determining when a person is a
public figure. 140 In fact, the Court did not even define the term public figure. 141
C. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc.
The U.S. Supreme Court continued to expand constitutional restrictions on
defamation actions in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., though the Court’s focus,
or at least the focus of the controlling plurality opinion, shifted from the status of
the person defamed (public official/public figure) to considering whether the
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Id.
Id.
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Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 142 (1967).
137
Id.
138
See id. at 155. In his plurality opinion, Justice Harlan did not impose the actual
malice standard applicable to public officials but instead a less demanding gross negligence
standard for public figures. Id. at 160, 166–67; Edward T. Fenno, Public Figure Libel: The
Premium on Ignorance and the Race to the Bottom, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 253, 279–80
(1995); Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905, 932 (1984).
However, five justices supported the application of the actual malice standard to public
figures, though Justices Black and Douglas further maintained that absolute protection
should be afforded to the press against defamation suits. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 336 & n.7 (1974); see also Catherine Hancock, Origins of the Public Figure
Doctrine in First Amendment Defamation Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 83 & n.11
(2005–2006).
139
Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 156–59.
140
Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, The Landmark That Wasn’t: A First Amendment
Play in Five Acts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 n.10 (2013).
141
See Jay Barth, Is False Imputation of Being Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Still
Defamatory? The Arkansas Case, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 527, 529–30 (2012)
(noting that “public figure” was only defined later in Gertz).
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subject matter reported on constituted a matter of public concern. 142 The case
brought before the Court involved George Rosenbloom, a distributor of “nudist
magazines” in Metropolitan Philadelphia. 143 While the police had not been trying
to arrest Rosenbloom, he had the misfortune of delivering magazines to a
newsstand at the same time Philadelphia police were conducting an anti-obscenity
raid, resulting in his arrest. 144 With Rosenbloom in custody, police officers
conducted a search of his home and a barn he used as a warehouse.145 During their
search, officers found a copious amount of pornography. 146 With this discovery, a
captain with the Philadelphia Police Department Special Investigations Squad
contacted multiple media outlets including Metromedia’s WIP Radio to report their
find. 147
As part of its newscast on October 3, 1963, WIP Radio informed its listeners
that
City Cracks Down on Smut Merchants. The Special Investigations Squad
raided the home of George Rosenbloom . . . this afternoon. Police
confiscated 1,000 allegedly obscene books at Rosenbloom’s home and
arrested him on charges of possession of obscene literature. The . . .
Squad also raided a barn . . . and confiscated 3,000 obscene books.
Captain Ferguson says he believes they have hit the supply of a main
distributor of obscene material in Philadelphia. 148
Rosenbloom, who argued the materials were not obscene, filed suit, seeking an
injunction to prevent the police from interfering with his business and an action
against a number of the media outlets that had referred to the materials as
obscene. 149 WIP Radio, which was not part of Rosenbloom’s original suit, covered
court proceedings in these cases. 150 Though it did not mention Rosenbloom by
name, the radio station informed its listeners that a distributor of pornography was
litigating in an attempt to get a local television station and newspaper to “lay off
the smut literature racket” and that “[t]he girlie-book peddler[] say[s] the police
crackdown and continued reference to [his] borderline literature as smut or filth is
hurting [his] business.” 151
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King, supra note 6, at 662–63.
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After learning about WIP’s broadcasts, Rosenbloom contacted the station,
asserting that his materials were not obscene. 152 The radio station informed
Rosenbloom that the District Attorney’s Office had indicated the materials were
obscene. 153 The District Attorney’s Office was wrong; the trial court ordered entry
of an acquittal on the criminal obscenity charges. 154 Following his acquittal,
Rosenbloom brought a defamation suit in federal court against WIP Radio. 155 The
jury returned a $775,000 verdict for Rosenbloom, but the trial court judge reduced
the amount of the verdict to $275,000. 156 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed the trial court, concluding that the actual malice standard
applied even though Rosenbloom was not a public figure because the broadcasts
were about matters of public concern and Rosenbloom had not shown actual
malice. 157
A fractured Supreme Court applied the actual malice standard to
Rosenbloom’s defamation claim but could not agree on a reason for doing so. 158
The three-justice plurality authored by Justice Brennan reasoned that “[i]f a matter
is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely
because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual
did not ‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved.” 159 Brennan added that “[t]he
public’s primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the
participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the
participant’s prior anonymity or notoriety.” 160 Thus, the plurality viewed its
standard as honoring “the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is
embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all
discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern,
without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.” 161
The Rosenbloom plurality did not ignore arguments in favor of retaining the
distinction between public figures and private persons. 162 However, the members
of the plurality concluded such an approach would improperly result in
“dampening discussion of issues of public or general concern because they happen
to involve private citizens,” thus a heightened standard needed to be applied. 163 In
the plurality’s view, “[v]oluntarily or not, we are all ‘public’ men to some
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degree.” 164 Thus, the controlling question after Rosenbloom in determining
whether the actual malice standard applies was whether the defamatory statement
related to a matter of public concern. 165 This approach, which would be the highwater mark for media protection against defamation suits, would be
jurisprudentially short-lived, but scholarly attachment thereto endures.
D. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court redirected its focus to the
status of the defamed plaintiff in determining whether the actual malice standard
applied, and in doing so the Court created a new structural framework for
analyzing defamation cases. 166 The events that gave rise to Gertz began with an
extended period of harassment of a youth by a police officer. 167 Chicago police
officer Richard Nuccio regarded Robert Nelson, a nineteen-year-old in the
neighborhood he patrolled, as a hoodlum. 168 Nuccio stopped and patted down
Nelson sixty to one hundred times over the course of eighteen months and never
found a weapon or contraband. 169 On June 4, 1968, Nelson either ran from or was
already running (he had been a runner on his high school track and field team)
when he encountered Nuccio. 170 The officer directed him to stop; Nelson did
not. 171 Without warning, Nuccio shot and killed Nelson. 172 The Chicago District
Attorney’s Office prosecuted Nuccio for murder. 173 At trial, Nuccio claimed selfdefense arguing that Nelson had lunged at him with a knife; however, no knife was
recovered. 174 Furthermore, the medical evidence established that Nelson had been
shot in the back at a distance of approximately eighty feet.175 A jury convicted
Nuccio of second-degree murder. 176
Nelson’s parents pursued civil monetary damages. 177 Another attorney
referred the Nelsons to Elmer Gertz. 178 On behalf of the Nelsons, Gertz pursued a
164
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David W. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 227 n.175 (1976); Marin Roger Scordato, The
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Changed: Understanding the Revolutionary New Era of English Defamation Law, 40
CONN. L. REV. 165, 191–92 (2007).
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See King, supra note 6, at 663–65.
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See ELMER GERTZ, GERTZ V. ROBERT WELCH, INC.: THE STORY OF A LANDMARK
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Id. at 15.
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Id. at 16.
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Id. at 19.
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strategy of filing actions in both state and federal courts, naming as defendants
Nuccio and the City of Chicago in the state court action but naming only Nuccio in
federal court, where liability and immunity issues were more likely to bar recovery
against the city given the willful and illegal nature of Nuccio’s conduct. 179
Little did Gertz know at the time, he was about to find himself in the
crosshairs of the John Birch Society. Created in the 1950s and rising to the height
of its influence in the 1960s, the John Birch Society was an ultraconservative
anticommunist organization. 180 The organization was focused on safeguarding the
nation against communist conspiracies. Its “message centered around the idea that
there was a vast left-wing conspiracy of American liberals, international
communists, and moderate American Republicans who worked together to
undermine the Christian values and individual liberties of Americans.” 181 By 1968
the John Birch Society had become convinced that communists were trying to
undermine local law enforcement by discrediting police officers. 182 Robert Welch,
the founder of the John Birch Society and the publisher of its monthly magazine
American Opinion, articulated that the end game of the conspiracy was to create
public pressure to replace local police with a national police force, which could
later be used to support a communist dictatorship. 183 The March 1969 issue of
American Opinion contained an article entitled FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio and
the War on Police. 184 The article alleged that Nuccio’s prosecution had been part
of the communist campaign against local police.185 The article, among other errors,
accused Gertz of being a Communist, framing Nuccio, assisting in planning the
1968 demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention, and having a
criminal record. 186
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rosenbloom, Gertz filed a
defamation action in the United States District Court for Northern District of
Illinois against Robert Welch, Inc., the publisher of American Opinion. 187 Drawing
upon the Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts decision, the publisher argued that Gertz
was a public official and/or public figure and that the article was related to a matter
178

Id.
Id.
180
Thomas Lansford, John Birch Society, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGION
AND POLITICS 233, 233–34 (2003).
181
Thomas Lansford, John Birch Society, in 2 GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW 322, 322 (Gregg Lee
Carter ed., 2002).
182
Diane L. Borden, Cyberlibel: Time to Flame the Times Standard, in THE
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ENVIRONMENT 91, 96 (Diane L. Borden & Kerric Harvey eds., 1998).
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40 (5th ed. 2007).
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See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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of public concern. 188 Gertz countered that the actual malice standard did not apply
to him because he was neither a public official nor a public figure. 189 The trial
court, which suffered from confusion throughout the case regarding the applicable
constitutional defamation standard, allowed the case to proceed to a jury verdict on
a less restrictive standard than actual malice, which resulted in a $50,000 judgment
for Gertz. 190 However, after the trial, the trial court set aside the verdict, having
determined the actual malice standard applied and that Gertz had not shown actual
malice. 191 Applying Rosenbloom, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. 192 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case 193 and subsequently
concluded that the actual malice standard did not apply to Gertz, thereby reframing
the constitutional constraints on defamation claims. 194
II. THE GERTZ CATEGORIZATION STRUCTURE 195
The Gertz Court structured an approach to defamation suits designed to
address the inherent tension between states’ interest in redressing injuries arising
from defamation and the constitutional safeguards necessary for a vigorous and
uninhibited press. 196 While theoretically “the balance between the needs of the
press and the individual’s claim to compensation for wrongful injury might be
struck on a case-by-case basis,” the Gertz Court recognized the impracticability
and substantive undesirability of such an approach. 197 Instead, the Court balanced
the competing interests by creating categorical groupings, assigning different types
of defamation plaintiffs to different categories, and setting forth rules to govern
those categories.
Pursuant to Gertz, plaintiffs in defamation cases can be classified into one of
five categories: (1) public officials, (2) all-purpose public figures, (3) limitedpurpose public figures, (4) involuntary public figures, and (5) private
individuals. 198 The public official designation applies “at the very least to those
among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public
to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental
188

See id. at 998–1000.
See LABUNSKI, supra note 144, at 149.
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Id. at 149–50.
192
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801, 808 (7th Cir. 1972).
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 410 U.S. 925, 925 (1973).
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974).
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Not all of the contours set forth below are contained in Gertz itself or its
predecessors. Some aspects of the structure have been clarified by post-Gertz decisions, but
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Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
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See JAMES SAMMATARO, FILM AND MULTIMEDIA AND THE LAW § 5:19, at 469–71
(2013).
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affairs.” 199 For the heightened protections of the actual malice test to apply to a
public official, 200 the allegedly defamatory speech must be related to official
conduct 201 or fitness for office. 202 The constitutional protection afforded by the
actual malice standard does not apply to people simply because they are public
employees. 203
As for the second category, the Gertz Court described all-purpose public
figures as persons who “occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence
that they are deemed public figures for all purposes.” 204 All-purpose public figures,
a category into which a relatively small number of persons will fall, 205 are
individuals with significant fame and notoriety, i.e., “household names.” 206 There
is a societal expectation that such persons are fodder for public discussion. 207
Because of the impact of being categorized as such, the Gertz Court established a
199

Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
See SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 3:23, at 3-60.
201
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
202
The Supreme Court in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), expressly
concluded that the heightened actual malice standard reached beyond official conduct to
fitness for office, including considerations of private character:
200

The New York Times rule is not rendered inapplicable merely because an
official’s private reputation, as well as his public reputation, is harmed. The
public-official rule protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of
information to the people concerning public officials, their servants. To this end,
anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office is relevant. Few
personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty,
malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though these characteristics may also
affect the official’s private character.
Id. at 77. Utilizing even starker language, the Supreme Court observed in Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971), that
[g]iven the realities of our political life, it is by no means easy to see what
statements about a candidate might be altogether without relevance to his fitness
for the office he seeks. The clash of reputations is the staple of election
campaigns, and damage to reputation is, of course, the essence of libel.
Id. at 275.
203
See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979).
204
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
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DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE § 5:6, at 5-52 (2003);
Dennise Mulvihill, Irving v. Penguin: Historians on Trial and the Determination of Truth
Under English Libel Law, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 217, 247 (2000).
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1A ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT,
PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 4:8, at 4-23 (3d ed. 2014); Gilles, supra note 1, at 251 n.118.
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Ellyn M. Angelotti, Twibel Law: What Defamation and its Remedies Look Like in
the Age of Twitter, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. 430, 446 (2013) (noting that “[s]ociety expects the
public to discuss and critique these people”).

974

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

presumption in favor of finding a person to be a limited-purpose as opposed to an
all-purpose public figure. The Court declared that “[a]bsent clear evidence of
general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the
affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all
aspects of his life.” 208 If the plaintiff in a defamation suit is an all-purpose public
figure, the constitutional protections of the actual malice standard apply. 209 By
definition, at least for purposes of defamation suits, there are no matters of private
concern for all-purpose public figures. 210 They are deemed a public figure for “all
purposes and in all contexts.” 211
Addressing the third category, the Gertz Court described limited-purpose
public figures as persons who have “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies” or “the vortex of [a] public issue,” “in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved” and in doing so “have assumed roles of especial
prominence in the affairs of society.” 212 Such persons are public figures in
connection with matters upon which they have assumed such a role, “but in all
other aspects of their lives they remain private figures.” 213 Accordingly, they are
public figures “for a limited range of issues.” 214 Because the categorization of a
person as a limited-purpose public figure inherently involves a determination of
whether the speech at issue addresses a “public controversy” or a “public issue,” if
the plaintiff is classified as a limited-purpose public figure, a matter of public
concern necessarily will be implicated, and the actual malice standard will
apply. 215
Describing the fourth category, the involuntary public figure category (a
classification into which the Gertz Court anticipated few would fall), the Court
defined involuntary public figures as persons who are “drawn into a particular
public controversy” and “become a public figure through no purposeful action of
[their] own.” 216 As with limited-purpose public figures, because categorization as
an involuntary public figure requires a finding of a “public controversy” into which
the person has been drawn, invariably a matter of public concern will be
implicated, and the actual malice standard will apply. 217
Finally, persons who are not public officials, all-purpose public figures,
limited-purpose public figures, or involuntary public figures are categorized as
208

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
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private individuals. As part of balancing the competing needs for a vigorous and
uninhibited press with the ability of the states to protect private individuals from
defamation, the Gertz Court, reversing Rosenbloom, removed the constitutional
mandate that the actual malice standard apply in cases in which the aggrieved
plaintiff is a private individual where the matter involved is one of public
concern. 218 However, the Gertz Court prohibited states from setting strict liability
standards in defamation suits but otherwise enabled states to set their own
standards for private individuals. 219
III. THE EROSION OF THE GERTZ STRUCTURE
Like a beautifully crafted sandcastle built too close to the shore, these
categorical distinctions have been hit by successive waves of First Amendment
pressure that have taken a toll on the edifice. The categorical lines and rationales
advanced in Gertz are worn and rounded. Rather than becoming clearer over time
through courts’ application of the Gertz framework, the categories have become
more confused, unsettled, and variant. 220
The Gertz framework has been eroded in at least five significant respects,
each of which is discussed below. First pressure from the First Amendment has
resulted in state and lower-federal courts expanding the category of persons who
218

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346–48.
Id. at 346–48 & n.10. Commentators addressing the Supreme Court’s decision in
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), have argued that
if the defamatory statements regarding a private person are not addressed to a matter of
public concern, then strict liability could apply:
219

The United States Supreme Court, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., held that when a private person who is neither a public official
nor a public figure sues for defamation arising from publication of matters that
are not of public concern, she need not prove actual damages as required in the
private person, public concern cases. Thus the common law rule of presumed
damages can be applied by the states to cases in this category if the states are so
minded.
Several decisions have said or assumed that the Dun & Bradstreet case
means that all of the common law rules remain intact, not merely the damages
rule. That would mean that in the private person case where the issue is not of
public concern, the states would also be free to presume falsehood as well as
damages, and possibly even to presume that the defendant was at fault; courts
could go back to the old common law of prima facie strict liability in this class
of cases. If the rules develop along these lines, courts in private person cases
will be required to determine what counts as an issue of public concern.
3 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 557 (2d ed. 2011 & Supp. 2013) (citations
omitted).
220
See King, supra note 6, at 650 (referring generally to the post-New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan defamation jurisprudence).
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constitute public officials, bringing that category into conflict with the rationale
underpinning Gertz’s distinguishing of private individuals from public figures. 221
Second, the definition of what constitutes a matter of public controversy has also
significantly expanded to incorporate a significantly broadened scope of persons
who will qualify as a public figure. 222 Third, private individuals’ lack of access to
channels of communications provided one of the two critical reasons for the Gertz
Court to distinguish public figures from private individuals. Forty years of
revolutionary technological change has dramatically reduced the force of this
rationale for distinguishing public figures from private persons. 223 Fourth, the
Gertz Court’s second reason for distinguishing public figures from private
individuals turned upon the Court’s view that public figures had voluntarily
accepted such scrutiny through their actions whereas private individuals had not.
Responding to First Amendment pressures, state and lower-federal courts,
however, have been expanding the concept of voluntariness into forms that reduce
the persuasiveness of the Court’s reasoning in distinguishing public figures from
private individuals on this basis. 224 Fifth, Justice William Brennan’s contention
advanced in his dissenting opinion in Gertz that there is no such thing as a private
person resonates significantly more today than it would or should have in 1974. 225
A. Erosion of the Narrow Understanding of Who Constitutes a Public Official
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger, noted in dicta in
Hutchinson v. Proxmire 226 that while the Supreme Court “has not provided precise
boundaries for the category of ‘public official’; it cannot be thought to include all
public employees.” 227 Contextualizing low-level public employees within the
broader scope of Gertz’s analysis, venerable defamation scholar Professor David
Elder has convincingly argued that imposition of the actual malice standard to lowlevel public employees is antithetical to the general reasoning behind the Gertz
framework. 228 He notes that “[l]ow-ranking or ‘garden variety’ public employees
do not in any realistic sense assume the risk of enhanced press scrutiny and they
generally have little access to the media for rebuttal on a ‘regular and continuing’
or other basis.” 229 Accordingly, Elder concludes that such low-level employees
have not forfeited their status as private individuals and need not meet the
heightened actual malice requirement; relatedly, Elder champions courts adhering
to “the thoughtful analysis of Justice Brennan in Rosenblatt v. Baer.” 230 As
221
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addressed above, Justice Brennan indicated that the public official designation
applies “at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees
who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control
over the conduct of governmental affairs.” 231 Elder would strictly hold the line “at
the very least” level and maintain a restrictive interpretation thereof.232 This would
maintain continuity with the broader Gertz analysis and avoid application of the
actual malice test to low-level government employees such as, in Elder’s view,
non-command level police officers and public school teachers.233
That aspiration has not, however, matched reality in terms of how many state
and federal courts have approached the classification of public employees. While
there are a significant number of decisions in which courts have drawn lines in a
manner akin to what Elder suggests, 234 the dam has been breached, and actual
application has moved far afield. Drawing a contrast with the narrow high-level
official understanding advanced by some courts and scholars, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, referencing police officers as an example, observed that “[i]n
practice, the term [public official] is now used more broadly and includes many
government employees.” 235 Professor Laurence Tribe has declared that irrespective
of the dicta in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, a narrow and restrictive understanding of
what constitutes a public official “has never been applied by the Supreme Court,
and lower courts have tended to disregard it as well, with the net effect that the
term ‘public official’ now embraces virtually all persons affiliated with the
government, such as most ordinary civil servants, including public school teachers
and policemen.” 236 Elder has observed that state and lower-federal courts in his
view “often ‘grossly interpret[], flagrantly misappl[y], or blatantly ignore[]’” the
restrictive and narrow understanding of what constitutes a public official. 237
Furthermore, he adds that in doing so, these courts “recognize the anomaly of
simultaneously adopting generally restrictive criteria for the public figure status
and open-ended criteria for the public official status.” 238
Nor is it apparent that state and lower-federal courts are proceeding in a
manner contrary to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Rosenblatt v. Baer by adopting
a more expansive understanding of who qualifies as a public official. Justice
Brennan certainly thought the broader understanding reflected in state and lower231

Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). The language was evidently added to
the opinion to appease Justice Harlan, who did not want to extend the actual malice
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ELDER, supra note 205, § 5:1, at 5-11 to -12 (quoting David Elder, Defamation,
Public Officialdom and the Rosenblatt v. Baer Criteria—A Proposal for Revivification:
Two Decades After New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 579, 667 (1984)).
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federal court decisions was the correct reading of his opinion.239 Writing postRosenblatt and Gertz, he observed,
We recognized [in Rosenblatt v. Baer], however, that First Amendment
protection cannot turn on formalistic tests of how “high” up the ladder a
particular government employee stands. Rather, we determined, the
focus must be on the nature of the public employee’s function and the
public’s particular concern with his work. Accordingly, we held:
Where a position in government has such apparent importance
that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications
and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general
public interest in the qualifications and performance of all
government employees, . . . the New York Times malice
standards apply.
In Rosenblatt itself, we found this standard satisfied with respect to Baer,
a supervisor of a county ski resort employed by and responsible to
county commissioners. 240
Addressing an Ohio Supreme Court decision that had, in his view, adopted an
excessively narrow understanding of what constitutes a public official for purpose
of application of the actual malice standard, Justice Brennan stated,
The Ohio court apparently read the language in Rosenblatt referring
to government employees having “substantial responsibility for or
control over the conduct of government affairs” as restricting the public
official designation to officials who set governmental policy. This
interpretation led it to conclude that finding a public employee like
Milkovich 241 to be a “public official” for purposes of defamation law
“would unduly exaggerate the ‘public official’ designation beyond its
original intendment.”
The Ohio court has seriously misapprehended our decision in
Rosenblatt. Indeed, the status of a public school teacher as a “public
official” for purposes of applying the New York Times rule follows a
fortiori from the reasoning of the Court in Rosenblatt . . . .
. . . [I]t is self-evident that “the public has an independent interest in
the qualifications and performance” of those who teach in the public high
schools that goes “beyond the general public interest in the qualifications
239

Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 957–60 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
240
Id. at 957–58 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86
(1966)).
241
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and performance of all government employees[.]” Public school teachers
thus fall squarely within the rationale of New York Times and Rosenblatt.
Moreover, Diadiun’s column challenged Milkovich’s qualifications to
teach young students in light of his conduct in connection with the Maple
Heights/Mentor High School incident. It is precisely this type of
discussion that New York Times and its progeny seek to protect. 242
The more expansive rendering of the public-official category by many state
courts and lower-federal courts arose neither from happenstance nor inattention.
The broader understanding of the public official category is consistent with
honoring the core purpose of the First Amendment, enabling self-governance, a
purpose that is discussed in more detail in Part III.B below. In an article that offers
a strong defense of application of the actual malice standard to public school
teachers, Richard Johnson noted,
[m]ost parents take an acute interest in the “qualifications and
performance” of any stranger who has . . . power over their children for
six or seven hours per day. This interest is likely to exist even for people
who are mostly indifferent to or ignorant of the “qualifications and
performance” of senators, governors, and the secretary of agriculture—
all of whom are unquestionably public officials. 243
This vital role for teachers has not gone unnoticed by courts. For instance, an
Illinois appeals court noted that “[p]ublic school teachers and coaches, and the
conduct of such teachers and coaches and their policies, are of as much concern to
the community as are other ‘public officials’ and ‘public figures.’” 244 For similar
reasons, courts have regularly concluded that even low-ranking police officers are
public officials; for example, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that
242

Id. at 958–60 (citations omitted). Ted Diadiun, a sports columnist for a local
newspaper, wrote a column criticizing Milkovich not only for his actions related to a melee
that broke-out at a wrestling match, resulting in multiple injuries requiring treatment in a
hospital, but also misrepresentation of the surrounding events at a hearing thereupon to the
Ohio High School Athletic Association. Id. at 955–57.
243
Richard E. Johnson, No More Teachers’ Dirty Looks—Now They Sue: An Analysis
of Plaintiff Status Determinations in Defamation Actions by Public Educators, 17 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 761, 791 (1990); see also Peter S. Cane, Note, Defamation of Teachers: Behind
the Times?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1191, 1206–07 (1988) (“Education is undeniably an area
of intense concern to the public, and educators are the most appropriate focus of that
concern.”).
244
Basarich v. Rodeghero, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); see, e.g., Kelley
v. Bonney, 606 A.2d 693, 710 (Conn. 1992) (“Unquestionably, members of society are
profoundly interested in the qualifications and performance of the teachers who are
responsible for educating and caring for the children in their classrooms.”); Johnston v.
Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla. 1978) (“[W]e can think of no
higher community involvement touching more families and carrying more public interest
than the public school system.”).
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“[a]lthough a comparably low-ranking government official, a patrolman’s office, if
abused, has great potential for social harm and thus invites independent interest in
the qualifications and performance of the person who holds the position.” 245
Accordingly, courts almost invariably classify police officers as public officials.246
Reflecting the self-government rationale in support of this categorization of police
officers, Professor Rodney Smolla has observed that “[i]t is hard to conceive of
speech more vital to a free and democratic society than speech concerning police
officials, for the police are the embodiment of the government’s maintenance of
social order.” 247 Professor Smolla’s observation provides an accurate and telling
indication of why state and lower-federal courts have adopted a more expansive
understanding of the category of public officials and the First Amendment values
served thereby. It does not, however, lessen Professor Elder’s observation, that this
approach, understandable and warranted as it is, puts public official classification
at odds with the rationale underlying the Gertz categorization framework
distinguishing public figures from private individuals. 248
B. Erosion of the Narrow Understanding of What Constitutes a Public
Controversy
Chief Justice Warren articulated the reason for extending the actual malice
constitutional safeguard to include speech related to public figures upon matters of
public concern in his concurring opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts:
To me, differentiation between “public figures” and “public
officials” and adoption of separate standards of proof for each have no
basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy. Increasingly in this
country, the distinctions between governmental and private sectors are
blurred. Since the depression of the 1930’s and World War II there has
been a rapid fusion of economic and political power, a merging of
science, industry, and government, and a high degree of interaction
between the intellectual, governmental, and business worlds. Depression,
war, international tensions, national and international markets, and the
surging growth of science and technology have precipitated national and
international problems that demand national and international solutions.
245

Moriarty v. Lippe, 294 A.2d 326, 330–31 (Conn. 1972); see also Rotkiewicz v.
Sadowsky, 730 N.E.2d 282, 287 (Mass. 2000) (noting that “because of the broad powers
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While these trends and events have occasioned a consolidation of
governmental power, power has also become much more organized in
what we have commonly considered to be the private sector. In many
situations, policy determinations which traditionally were channeled
through formal political institutions are now originated and implemented
through a complex array of boards, committees, commissions,
corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected with the
Government. This blending of positions and power has also occurred in
the case of individuals so that many who do not hold public office at the
moment are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of
important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in
areas of concern to society at large. 249
Chief Justice’s Warren’s portrait of the public figure, which provided the
foundation for the Gertz Court’s embrace and structuring of the public-figure
category, 250 is plainly the image of “a nominally private person [who] exercises as
much, if not more, influence on the determination of public policy issues as do
many public officials.” 251 In that sense, the public figure doctrine “is heavily
grounded in the public policy of facilitating free social discourse—those who
voluntarily seek to influence events and issues may appropriately be forced to
accept as part of the bargain a greater risk of defamation.” 252
In adopting such an approach, the Court honors the core self-governance
purpose of the First Amendment. 253 Protections for freedom of speech are naturally
deduced from principles of self-government, which require the electorate to be able
to gain sufficient knowledge to fulfill its responsibilities. 254 Simply stated, “speech
concerning public affairs . . . is the essence of self-government.” 255 In absence of
the information derived from such speech, “citizens cannot play their assigned
roles in choosing and instructing their representatives and in participating in the
formation of public policy.” 256 Even where the role of the electorate is viewed as
249

Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163–64 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring).
250
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); see also Schauer,
supra note 138, at 914.
251
Schauer, supra note 138, at 916.
252
SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 2:35.50, at 2-64.35.
253
See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 1024
(2011) (noting the “core self-governance goals of the First Amendment”); Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 799, 839 (stating that “[i]t is generally agreed that a core purpose of the First
Amendment is to foster the ideal of democratic self-governance”).
254
See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 27 (1948); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute,
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255.
255
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).
256
Lidsky, supra note 253, at 810.
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more responsive to than generative of public policy, political speech protections
still serve a “checking value,” allowing for “checking the abuse of power by public
officials” through voters’ use of an electoral “veto power to be employed when the
decisions of officials pass certain bounds.” 257 Whatever disagreements the
Supreme Court has had over the exact applications of the First Amendment, there
has been consensus that the constitutional guarantee protecting freedom of speech
safeguards discussions of governmental action and inaction. 258 With nominally
private persons exercising considerable influence in guiding and directing public
policy questions, it is readily apparent that such persons have entered the arena of
public policy determination. 259
However, Professor Frederick Schauer has properly observed that the Court’s
archetype of the public figure as a political actor engaged in influencing and
directing political affairs “is only a part, and perhaps only comparatively small
part, of the domain of public figures. The universe of public figures includes many
people whose involvement in or influence on public policy matters is either
attenuated or nonexistent.” 260 For example, the Supreme Court’s recognition of
Butts as a public figure has given rise “to a substantial amount of case law
according public figure status to sports figures with little or no specific, reasoned
discussion of the rationale for such a designation.” 261 Professor Smolla does not
make the mistake of failing to provide reasoned articulation in arguing for athletes
as public figures. To the contrary, he argues for doing so in straightforward and
cogent terms:
Professional athletes voluntarily enter the “arena,” quite literally the
“sports arena,” and issues germane to their performance or fitness,
including issues relating to mental and physical health, but also to their
character and position in society as role models, justify treating
professional athletes as public figures and also justifies a reasonably
broad understanding of the range of issues concerning the professional
athlete’s life that falls within the perimeter of that public figure status.262
While Professor Smolla’s defense of the view of athletes as public figures is a
strong one, it is also significantly removed from the underlying rationale for
imposing the same heightened constitutional protections to speech regarding public
257

Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 527, 542 (1977).
258
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966); Margaret Tarkington, A First
Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney Speech, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27, 60 (2011)
(noting that “the Court carefully protects political speech, considering it at the ‘core’ of the
First Amendment”).
259
See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163–64 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring).
260
Schauer, supra note 138, at 917.
261
ELDER, supra note 205, § 5:20, at 5-161 (citation omitted).
262
SMOLLA, supra note 213, § 6:40, at 6-361.
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figures as public officials. 263 Athletes are not thrusting themselves into issues of
public policy seeking to impact the resolution thereof; rather, they are engaging in
an occupation that attracts public attention. It is not necessary that the latest gossip
about an athlete’s injury be discussed for the citizenry to participate in democratic
self-governance.
While weakening the citadel walls of the underlying justifications for the
categorical structure devised by Gertz, state and lower-federal courts’ embracing
of an understanding of public controversy that extends beyond the political sphere
is not errant. To the contrary, such an approach accurately reflects the broader nonself-governance constitutional purposes served by the speech and press protections
of the First Amendment. As noted by Alexis de Tocqueville in discussing the
importance of a free press in America, “[i]t is not political opinions only, but all
the views of men which are influenced by freedom of the press. It modifies mores
as well as laws.” 264 In accordance therewith, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
limited the protections of freedom of speech to purely political speech. 265 To the
contrary, the Court has recognized that “guarantees for speech and press are not the
preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those
are to healthy government.” 266 Protected speech could also, for example, be related
to economic, religious, or cultural matters 267 because First Amendment protections
embrace a “right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences.” 268 In fact, in recent years the
non-political entertainment-related speech issues that have been before the
Supreme Court have been so pronounced in terms of their “sheer volume, [that] . . .
media entertainment speech seems to be subtly changing the cultural backdrop of
the First Amendment, relegating political speech to a subordinate level within the
general cultural awareness,” though the actual importance of political speech is
undiminished. 269
In addition to its role in democratic self-governance, free speech is also
critical for (1) ascertaining truth, (2) realizing individual self-fulfillment, (3)
enabling participation from members of society in decision-making on non263
Compare id. (contending that it is justified to treat professional athletes as public
figures), with Schauer, supra note 138, at 917 (arguing that, for the most part, athletes are
not public figures because they have “little, if any, effect on questions of politics, public
policy, or the organization or determination of societal affairs”); see also Curtis Publ’g
Co., 388 U.S. at 162–64 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (outlining the rationales for applying
the same standard to public figures and public officials).
264
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 180 (J. P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1969).
265
See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
266
Id.
267
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
268
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
269
Patrick M. Garry, The First Amendment and Non-Political Speech: Exploring a
Constitutional Model That Focuses on the Existence of Alternative Channels of
Communication, 72 MO. L. REV. 477, 478 (2007).
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political societal questions, and (4) maintaining a balance between societal stability
and change. 270 First, addressing the role of free speech in the ascertainment of
truth, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes offered an indelible image of the marketplace
of ideas in which purchase of truth is to be found through a Darwinian struggle. 271
Justice Holmes wrote,
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a
certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law
and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to
indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he
has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-heartedly for the
result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is
an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our
salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While
that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of
the law that an immediate check is required to save the country. 272
Freedom of speech in the marketplace of ideas creates a “proving ground,” 273 in
which a “constant competitive interplay of ideas moves society more quickly
toward a truthful understanding of the world.” 274
The other three primary rationales for safeguarding freedom of speech also
serve an important role outside the sphere of public policy. The second rationale,
safeguarding free speech for the purpose of realizing individual self-fulfillment,
270

Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 878–79 (1963).
271
See generally JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND
RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED AMERICA 89–90, 113–14 (2006) (addressing Holmes attachment
to a Social Darwinist view of the political process but opposition to constitutionalizing
such an approach in economic liberties cases).
272
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
273
David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 91 (2012).
274
Marin R. Scordato & Paula A. Monopoli, Free Speech Rationales After September
11th: The First Amendment in Post-World Trade Center America, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 185, 194 (2002).
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provides an essential method of self-expression. 275 As noted by Justice Thurgood
Marshall, “[t]he First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also
those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression.” 276 Under this
approach, “truth of expression is irrelevant and secondary to the legal capability of
[persons] to express [themselves] . . . .” 277
Third, in terms of the role of free speech in societal decision making, free
speech enables communication of one’s judgments and creation of a culture and
community, whether that is in the area of arts and literature, the sciences, or any
other area of knowledge or communal association. 278 In this vein, free speech plays
a vital role in “decisionmaking on all social values.” 279
Finally, safeguarding free speech serves the purpose of balancing societal
stability with change by providing a safety-valve release for those holding
heterodox views. 280 The safety-valve concept reflects a sense that freedom of
speech takes the lid off the boiling pot, allowing steam to be released and avoiding
more serious social unrest and violence that may follow from not having that
release. 281 In addition, this balancing of stability with change through avoiding
suppression of heterodoxy maintains societal vitality against the tendency toward
stagnation and rigidity that in the absence of such freedom threatens to ossify a
society. 282
While political speech is at the core of the First Amendment, 283 the protection
of freedom of speech also serves other critical purposes as addressed above. Chief
Justice Warren’s justification for the extension of the constitutional safeguards of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to speech regarding public figures rested on the
core self-governance purpose of the First Amendment. The extension of the actual
malice standard to persons who are not engaged in influencing political questions
but who are public figures with regard to other matters of public concern honors
the broader purposes served by the First Amendment. 284 This consistent
application beyond the political realm constituted a necessary expansion in the
understanding of what constitutes a public controversy. However, in embracing
this broader understanding in state and lower-federal courts, the categorization
structure created by Gertz has been further eroded. If public controversy is
275

See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. REV. 964, 993–94 (1978).
276
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
277
Hilary Schronce Blackwood, Regulating Student Cyberbullying, 40 RUTGERS L.
REC. 153, 175 (2012–2013).
278
Emerson, supra note 270, at 882–83.
279
Lee C. Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438, 471
(1983).
280
Emerson, supra note 270, at 884–86.
281
See Scordato & Monopoli, supra note 274, at 199.
282
Emerson, supra note 270, at 884–86.
283
See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208.
284
See Schauer, supra note 138, at 931.
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understood in terms of matters of public policy, it is much easier to understand
whether a person has thrust herself into that arena. Where nonpolitical cultural,
religious, sporting, and scientific matters, among others, can constitute a basis for a
public controversy, it becomes exceedingly more difficult to discern when
someone has thrust herself into that arena and thereby made herself a public figure
because the multiplicity and variety thereof is extraordinary.
C. Erosion of the Lack of Media Access Rationale
The chasm between private and public persons’ access to media and means
for counteracting defamatory comments stood as one of the two central reasons the
Gertz Court distinguished defamation plaintiffs into the categories of public and
private persons and applied varying constitutional standards to these different types
of plaintiffs. 285 The Gertz Court reasoned,
[t]he first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help—using
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. Public officials and
public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels
of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity
to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy.
Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state
interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater. 286
The change in access to channels of effective communication for an ordinary
citizen from 1974 to 2014 has been extraordinary. 287 While the enormity of the
societal revolution that has occurred over the last four decades is difficult to fully
comprehend, it can be gleaned that “the ability for self-help has spread to the
masses.” 288 Reflecting on the rapid advance of technologically-driven societal
changes, Thomas Friedman observed that when he wrote The World is Flat,
“Facebook didn’t exist for most people, ‘Twitter’ was still a sound, the ‘cloud’ was
something in the sky, ‘3G’ was a parking space, ‘applications’ were what you sent

285

SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 2:13, at 2-30 (“The Gertz compromise was grounded in
two rationales reflecting the Supreme Court’s perceptions about the differences between
public and private figures. The first of these rationales is the ‘access to the media’
argument.”).
286
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
287
See BRUCE A. SHUMAN, ISSUES FOR LIBRARIES AND INFORMATION SCIENCE IN THE
INTERNET AGE, at x (2001) (asserting that the “rise of the Internet is one of the most
astonishing developments of this or any other century, compared by some writers in
importance to the capture of fire and to Gutenberg’s printing press”).
288
Jeff Kosseff, Private or Public? Eliminating the Gertz Defamation Test, 2011 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 249, 266.
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to college, and ‘Skype’ was a typo.” 289 Friedman wrote The World Is Flat in
2005; 290 Gertz was decided in 1974. In “the mid-1970s, the media landscape was
much more sparsely populated than it is today and consumers had far fewer
choices.” 291 In 1974, computers were still for governments, large corporations, and
a few hobbyists. 292 The internet was an unknown domain reserved for high science
and the military. 293 Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak would not develop their first
mainstream computer, the Macintosh, for another ten years. 294 Netscape would not
offer the first non-techie Internet interface for another seventeen years.295 The first
blog was twenty years away, and widespread blogging would not appear for
twenty-five years. 296
In 1974 channels of communication were essentially confined to local
newspapers, commercial radio stations, the big-three television networks, and
national newsmagazines. 297 The limited number and narrowness of control of
289

THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO BE US: HOW
AMERICA FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND HOW WE CAN COME BACK 59
(2011).
290
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (2005).
291
DAVID CROTEAU & WILLIAM HOYNES, THE BUSINESS OF MEDIA: CORPORATE
MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 111 (2d ed. 2006).
292
See JANNA QUITNEY ANDERSON, IMAGINING THE INTERNET: PERSONALITIES,
PREDICTIONS, PERSPECTIVES 39–42 (2005) (noting that computers were extremely
expensive, most were so large they could fill an entire room, and many organizations
“shared” time on a single computer).
293
See MARY LOU ROBERTS & DEBRA ZAHAY, INTERNET MARKETING: INTEGRATING
ONLINE & OFFLINE STRATEGIES 3–4 (3d ed. 2013).
294
ROBERT J. CARBAUGH, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS: AN APPLICATIONS
APPROACH 103 (7th ed. 2014).
295
Pamela Samuelson & Hal R. Varian, The “New Economy” and Information
Technology Policy, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1990S 361, 365–66 (Jeffrey A.
Frankel & Peter R. Orszag eds., 2002).
296
ROB BROWN, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE SOCIAL WEB: HOW TO USE SOCIAL
MEDIA AND WEB 2.0 IN COMMUNICATIONS 26 (2009). As Brown explains,
[t]he first bloggers were . . . effectively online diarists, who would keep a
running account of their lives. These blogs began well before the term was
coined and the authors referred to themselves usually as diarists or online
journalists. Perhaps the first of these and therefore the original blogger was
Justin Hall, who began blogging in 1994.
Id. Public participation in blogging started to significantly increase in 1999 with the
appearance of Blogger, which was purchased by Google four years later. Id.
297
See, e.g., RICHARD CAMPBELL ET AL., MEDIA & CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
MASS COMMUNICATION G-8 (8th ed. 2013) (describing the mid-1950s through the late1970s as the network era for the dominance of the big three television networks: ABC,
CBS, and NBC); Kevin Drum, A Blogger Says: Save The MSM!, Mother Jones,
March/April 2007, available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2007/03/blogger-says
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media outlets “effectively thwart[ed] any popular participation in the press and
commercial radio and television.” 298 Things have changed dramatically. There has
been a “wave of media democratization . . . with the popularization of the Internet,
especially Web 2.0. . . . In contrast to [earlier] participation through the
Internet . . . , [more recent] participation in the Internet focuses on the
opportunities provided to non-media professionals to []produce media content
themselves and to []organize the structures that allow for this media
production.” 299 While Web 2.0, which roughly dates to the year 2000, “is a
slippery character to pin down,” the core thereof is technological services
including “blogs, wikis, podcasts, Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds etc.,
which facilitate a more socially connected Web where everyone is able to add to
and edit the information space.” 300
From young to old, rich to poor, this technological revolution has been
embraced. 301 As of December 2013, the Pew Research Internet Project found that
73% of adults use social media, 71% use Facebook, 22% use LinkedIn, 21% use
Pinterest, 18% use Twitter, and 17% use Instagram. 302 People use social media as a
“key source [of] news and information,” 303 and an important forum for debate and
discussion of public issues. 304 While social media is ascending, traditional media is
in sharp decline. 305 In 1964, the year New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was decided,
-save-msm, archived at http://perma.cc/E343-H5JY (stating that in the early- to mid-1970s
“most people still had pretty limited access to news . . . one or two newspapers, three TV
networks, and a few national newsmagazines”).
298
Nico Carpentier et al., Waves of Media Democratization: A Brief History of
Contemporary Participatory Practices in the Media Sphere, 19 CONVERGENCE: INT’L J.
RES. INTO NEW MEDIA TECHS. 287, 291 (2013).
299
Id. at 292; see also David Lat & Zach Shemtob, Public Figurehood in the Digital
Age, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 403, 410 (2011) (noting that in the mid-1970s “false
charges could only be countered through access to a printing press, radio station, or
television network—modes of communication that ordinary citizens generally could not tap
into”).
300
PAUL ANDERSON, WEB 2.0 AND BEYOND: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNOLOGIES 1
(2012).
301
See Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT,
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/M2R-ENCX (last visited Sept. 27, 2014). The study found that 65% of
persons fifty to sixty-four years of age used social media—that number is even higher for
younger age groups—and social media usage only had minor fluctuation by household
income level with slightly higher use at the lowest income level. Id.
302
See MAEVE DUGGAN & AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA
UPDATE 2013, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2013/12/PIP_Soci
al-Networking-2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7KFE-WVHK.
303
Alan B. Albarran, Preface to THE SOCIAL MEDIA INDUSTRIES, at xix (Alan B.
Albarran ed., 2013).
304
Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 2003–04 (2011).
305
THE CONCISE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 58
(Michael Kazin et al. eds., 2011).
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81% of Americans read a daily print newspaper. 306 As of 2012, only 23% of
Americans did so. 307 The Internet has now become the main source for news for
those under the age of fifty and is only second behind television for all Americans,
well ahead of newspaper and radio usage. 308 Seeking to survive the onslaught,
traditional media outlets are adapting. 309 Newspapers and magazines have opened
news stories to comments from the public 310 and created forums for citizen
journalism. 311 With editorial controls loosening, newspapers and magazines have
also adopted more accommodating approaches to corrections, which have become
a more effective mechanism for obtaining self-help. 312 Some websites have even
created formal right-of-reply features allowing aggrieved parties to set the record
straight. 313
306

HERMANN SIMON, BEAT THE CRISIS: 33 QUICK SOLUTIONS FOR YOUR COMPANY
13 (2010).
307
Number of Americans Who Read Print Newspapers Continues Decline, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/number-of-am
ericans-who-read-print-newspapers-continues-decline/, archived at http://perma.cc/5DAZAB97.
308
PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, AMID CRITICISM, SUPPORT
FOR MEDIA’S ‘WATCHDOG’ ROLE STANDS OUT 10–11 (2013), available at http://www.peo
ple-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/8-8-2013%20Media%20Attitudes%20Release.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/TJ4W-LSQF.
309
See Dina A. Ibrahim, Broadcasting and Cable Networks, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOCIAL NETWORKS 89, 90–92 (George A. Barnett ed., 2011).
310
See Paul Grabowicz, The Transition to Digital Journalism, KDMCBERKELEY (July
23, 2014), http://multimedia.journalism.berkeley.edu/tutorials/digital-transform/commentson-news-stories/, archived at http://perma.cc/5VPB-C9CW (noting that “[o]ne of the most
basic ways that a news organization can engage people is to provide a way for them to
comment on and discuss news stories on the website and postings to staff weblogs”).
311
See, e.g., Citizen Journalism, Mediashift, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/soci
al-media/citizen-journalism/, archived at http://perma.cc/57QG-ZQL7 (last visited July 10,
2014) (providing internet links for individuals to act as citizen journalists regarding current
national and international topics).
312
See Kosseff, supra note 288, at 266–67.
313
See Jamie Lund, Managing Your Online Identity, J. INTERNET L., May 2012, at 3,
5 (“A good example of this type of ‘right of reply’ is found on RateMyProfessors.com. The
content from RateMyProfessors.com is generated by students commenting on the
performance of their professors based on various criteria, including easiness, clarity, and
helpfulness. The purpose of the site is to allow students to vent or to make endorsements to
would-be students about various professors. The site is consequently a receptacle for both
insults and praise. To promote an open dialogue, the site allows professors to rebut any
particular statement posted about them, with those rebuttals then published in conjunction
with the original student comments. In this way, RateMyProfessors.com allows for
correction of misinformation with minimum administrative oversight. Right-of-reply
websites are models for other sites in that they have managed to allow for uninhibited
freedom of expression while also providing a meaningful means of correcting false
statements without requiring costly administrative expenditures by the site owners.”
(citations omitted)).
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The cumulative effect of the advances in technology and social media is
extraordinary and would have been unthinkable to the members of the Supreme
Court in 1974. In 2014, “ordinary people can now publish their thoughts on
Twitter . . . attack those in power on Blogger . . . and report on events excluded
from other mainstream media by sending their own news stories and photos to
citizen journalism sites like Demotix.” 314 Through their online engagement,
ordinary people have “the opportunity to share their experiences (good and bad),
air their views and opinions, and vent their frustrations.” 315 Not only can ordinary
people communicate, but they are also able to do so with a vast potential
audience 316 and at an extremely low cost. 317 Professors Andrea Press and Bruce
Williams have observed that “new media . . . challenges elites . . . by providing
communication channels for ordinary citizens to directly produce and access
information about political, social, and economic life.” 318 Technological changes
314

KEN BROWNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY 324 (4th ed. 2011).
TERRY NICKLIN, CAMBRIDGE MARKETING HANDBOOK: STAKEHOLDER 58 (2013).
316
See BROWNE, supra note 314, at 324; Michelle Sherman, The Anatomy of a Trial
with Social Media and the Internet, J. INTERNET L., May 2011, at 1, 1 (stating that “[s]ocial
media is connection. It is communication, a rather unlimited form of it with people
speaking to a large audience.”); Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to
Corrective Speech: A New Test for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 833, 835
(2006) (noting that “[t]he average citizen—previously confined to the one-to-one methods
of distributing information—enjoys a potential global audience on the internet”).
317
See Geoffrey W.G. Leane, Deliberative Democracy and the Internet: New
Possibilities for Legitimising Law Through Public Discourse?, 23 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 373,
379–80 (2010); Stephen C. Jacques, Comment, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Internet, the
First Amendment, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1945, 1989 (1997)
(observing that “[t]he Internet . . . breaks down . . . barriers, offering an egalitarian form of
communication where the cost is little or nothing and an opinion is instantaneously
distributed worldwide”). In contrast, media of the Gertz era required enormous capital
investment; for example, printing and distributing newspapers required substantial
expenditures including printing presses, delivery trucks and delivery persons, reporters,
editors, assistants, etc. See SHANNON E. MARTIN & KATHLEEN A. HANSEN, NEWSPAPERS
OF RECORD IN A DIGITAL AGE: FROM HOT TYPE TO HOT LINK 44 (1998).
318
ANDREA L. PRESS & BRUCE A. WILLIAMS, THE NEW MEDIA ENVIRONMENT: AN
INTRODUCTION 20 (2010); see also Dan Gillmor, Bloggers Breaking Ground in
Communication, EJOURNAL USA GLOBAL ISSUES, March 2006, at 24, 24 (“Software
technology that allows writers to easily post their own essays on the World Wide Web has
challenged the traditional role of media organizations as gatekeepers to a mass audience. At
a steadily increasing pace over the last several years, ordinary citizens have made
themselves into reporters and commentators on the social scene. They have made a
remarkably rapid ascent onto their own platform in the realm of social and political
debate.”). Conservative political commentator Hugh Hewitt has argued that “[t]he power of
elites to determine what [is] news via a tightly controlled dissemination system [has been]
shattered. The ability and authority to distribute text are now truly democratized.” HUGH
HEWITT, BLOG: UNDERSTANDING THE INFORMATION REFORMATION THAT’S CHANGING
YOUR WORLD 70–71 (2005); cf. David Gauntlett, Creativity and Digital Innovation, in
DIGITAL WORLD: CONNECTIVITY, CREATIVITY AND RIGHTS 77, 80 (Gillian Youngs ed.,
315
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have given rise to a democratization of the means of media production and the
manner in which information is obtained, and this has greatly empowered the
ordinary person. 319 New-media bloggers are in fact now holding the traditional
institutional news media accountable for errors. 320
This new reality has not gone entirely unnoticed by courts. For example, the
Delaware Supreme Court observed that ordinary persons now have available
a very powerful form of extrajudicial relief. The internet provides a
means of communication where a person wronged by statements of an
anonymous poster can respond instantly, can respond to the allegedly
defamatory statements on the same site or blog, and thus, can, almost
contemporaneously, respond to the same audience that initially read the
allegedly defamatory statements. The [person] can thereby easily correct
any misstatements or falsehoods, respond to character attacks, and
generally set the record straight. This unique feature of internet
communications allows a potential plaintiff ready access to mitigate the
harm, if any, he has suffered to his reputation as a result of an
anonymous defendant’s allegedly defamatory statements made on an
internet blog or in a chat room. 321
Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court, in adopting a broad interpretation for
statutory protection for online speech, observed a policy of encouraging
“defamation victims to seek self-help, their first remedy, by ‘using available
opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its
adverse impact on reputation.’” 322 In doing so, the Georgia Supreme Court
indicated that it was “strik[ing] a balance in favor of ‘uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open’ debate in an age of communications when ‘anyone, anywhere in the
world, with access to the Internet’ can address a worldwide audience of readers in
cyberspace.” 323

2013) (addressing the shift in perception of media as wholly separate and above the masses
with the empowerment of the ordinary person to reach mass audiences through
technology).
319
DAVID TAYLOR & DAVID MILES, FUSION: THE NEW WAY OF MARKETING 11
(2011); cf. CARNE ROSS, THE LEADERLESS REVOLUTION: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE WILL
TAKE POWER AND CHANGE POLITICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, at xvii (2011)
(declaring that “in an increasingly interconnected system, such as the world emerging in
the twenty-first century, the action of one individual or a small group can affect the whole
system very rapidly”).
320
S. Robert Lichter, The Media, in UNDERSTANDING AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF
AN EXCEPTIONAL NATION 181, 215 (Peter H. Schuck & James Q. Wilson eds., 2008).
321
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 464 (Del. 2005).
322
Mathis v. Cannon, 573 S.E.2d 376, 385 (Ga. 2002) (quoting Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974)).
323
Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
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Congress has similarly looked to self-help as an appropriate remedy. In
enacting the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), Congress found that
“[t]he Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and
myriad avenues for intellectual activity.” 324 Congress also found “[t]he Internet
and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all
Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.” 325 Among other
objectives of the CDA, Congress sought “to promote the continued development of
the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media
[and] to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation.” 326 To serve these ends, Congress passed a measure ensuring that “[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.” 327 As a practical consequence, this leaves available the remedy of online
self-help, a remedy that Congress has found appropriate. 328
Extra-legal solutions are also available through the emergence of private
companies offering online reputation management tools. For example,
Reputation.com, also known as Reputation Defender, has embraced facilitating
control for individuals and businesses over their online appearance as its corporate
mission. 329 To achieve this end, such entities can monitor online commentary,
boost positive comments in search engine ranking returns while lowering negative
comments, and scrub negative comments by having them removed. 330 This
approach offers certain advantages over defamation suits including eliminating
defamatory statements and avoiding drawing additional attention to the defamatory
material. 331
324

47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2012).
Id. § 230(a)(4).
326
Id. § 230(b)(1), (2).
327
Id. § 230(c)(1).
328
See Angelotti, supra note 207, at 485; Allison E. Horton, Note, Beyond Control?:
The Rise and Fall of Defamation Regulation on the Internet, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1265,
1305–06 (2009).
329
Search Results, REPUTATION.COM, http://www.reputation.com/reputationdefender,
archived at http://perma.cc/D4W8-L5NG (last visited Aug. 14, 2014).
330
See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from
John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1390 (2009). See generally Angelotti, supra note 207, at
495 (describing some of the means by which such companies accomplish their objectives
on behalf of their clients).
331
See Lidsky, supra note 330, at 1390. Professor Jacqueline Lipton also notes,
325

These services provide a number of advantages over legal solutions to
online abuses, including the fact that several of them now have many years of
experience with reputation management and have established solid working
relationships with websites that host harmful communications. The use of
private commercial services does not raise the specter of a First Amendment
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Though the Supreme Court has not addressed the availability of technological
tools in the context of defamation, the availability of self-help technology services,
as opposed to legally imposed restrictions on speech, has proven relevant to the
Court’s analysis of other free speech issues. For example, addressing decencyrelated restrictions, the Court expressly indicated “the mere possibility that userbased Internet screening software would ‘soon be widely available’ was relevant to
our rejection of an overbroad restriction of indecent cyberspeech.” 332 The litigation
strategy from those aiming to invalidate restrictions imposed by the CDA was
squarely focused on the availability of self-help remedies provided by
technological services and, thus, on the reduced need for governmentally imposed
speech restrictions. 333 As Professor Ann Bartow observed, that was precisely
where the Justices turned in analyzing the constitutionality of the decency
restrictions imposed by Congress, noting
a remedy was available for parents who did not want their children
exposed to pornography or “indecency” on the Internet. They could
purchase filtering software (a.k.a. “censorware”) and subscribe to related
content filtering services to keep undesired words and images away from
their computers. In this way they could accomplish with their private
purchasing power what the government would not do for them in terms
of providing tools to regulate the information that was accessible to their
children. 334
Addressing a free speech issue, though not defamation, nearly two decades
ago when internet usage was at a stage of comparative infancy, the U.S. Supreme
Court observed that “[t]hrough the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line
challenge. . . . [M]any laws directed at curtailing online speech may raise First
Amendment concerns and may be open to constitutional challenge. Reputation
management services also avoid many of the practical problems associated with
litigation including jurisdictional challenges and difficulties identifying a
defendant in the first place. A commercial service does not need to identify or
locate a potential defendant in order to engage in astroturfing or search engine
optimization. Resort to a reputation management service also avoids drawing
public attention to the damaging content. Harmful content can simply be
unobtrusively de-prioritized in search engine results.
Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103,
1147 (2011) (citations omitted).
332
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000) (quoting
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 876–77 (1997)).
333
See generally Tom W. Bell, Pornography, Privacy, and Digital Self Help, 19 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 133, 138–42 (2000) (describing how self-help
remedies have made certain legislative restrictions on speech that is indecent or harmful to
minors unnecessary and unconstitutional).
334
Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online
Harassment, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 383, 422 (2009) (citations omitted).
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can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the
same individual can become a pamphleteer.” 335 The empowerment of ordinary
citizens has grown exponentially in the last two decades, fundamentally
undermining the Gertz notion that private persons do not have meaningful access
to channels of communication for redressing attacks on their reputations.
D. Erosion of the Voluntariness Rationale
While the lack of access to channels of communication in 1974 influenced the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in distinguishing public and private persons, the heart
of the Gertz Court’s division of limited-purpose public figures from private
individuals was voluntariness. 336 The Gertz Court envisioned public figures as
persons “thrust[ing] themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved” and in doing so
“assum[ing] roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society.” 337 Such a
person “voluntarily injects himself . . . into a particular public controversy.” 338 The
concept of an involuntary public figure stands in sharp contradistinction with
“[w]ords and phrases such as ‘thrust’ . . . and ‘in order to influence the resolution
of the issues.’” 339
However, “[w]hat is and is not voluntary is by no means self-evident.” 340 And
what is declared by courts to be voluntary looks increasingly less limited to
persons thrusting themselves into matters of public controversies in order to
influence the resolution thereof. Professor Smolla’s explanation of the application
of public figure status to athletes is revealing on this point:
Professional athletes voluntarily enter the “arena,” quite literally the
“sports arena,” and issues germane to their performance or fitness,
including issues relating to mental and physical health, but also to their
character and position in society as role models, justify treating
professional athletes as public figures and also justifies a reasonably
broad understanding of the range of issues concerning the professional
athlete’s life that falls within the perimeter of that public figure status.341
335

Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
Hopkins, supra note 217, at 19 (noting that “voluntariness seemed to be the key
element in determining whether a libel plaintiff is a public figure”). Questions have been
raised, however, about the soundness of the voluntariness rationale. See, e.g., Anderson,
supra note 246, at 527–30 (listing a number of reasons why public figures may not have
voluntarily thrust themselves into the public eye, thereby undermining the voluntariness
rationale).
337
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
338
Id. at 351.
339
SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 2:33, at 2-64.12 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345).
340
Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 684, 703 (D.N.J. 1985).
341
SMOLLA, supra note 213, § 6:40, at 6-361.
336
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Professional athletes have entered an arena that attracts considerable public
attention, but professional athletes have not “thrust” themselves to “the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved.” 342 Instead, the voluntariness aspect derives from entering into a
profession that “command[s] the attention of sports fans.” 343 With this transition,
even the voice shifts in a number of judicial opinions from active to passive. For
example, in determining whether a plaintiff, a professional football player, was a
public figure, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, “Chuy had been
thrust into public prominence.” 344
The concept even extends to individuals who scrupulously endeavor to
maintain their anonymity and privacy and to avoid the public sphere. While noting
that the Mafioso figure in the case before it “yearns for [the] shadow,” the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, nevertheless, found him to be a public figure because, by
being a Mafioso, he “voluntarily engaged in a course that was bound to invite
attention and comment.” 345 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals embraced the same
understanding, concluding that “[w]hen an individual undertakes a course of
conduct that invites attention, even though such attention is neither sought nor
desired, he may be deemed a public figure.” 346 In other words, “‘[v]oluntariness,’
for purposes of public figure status, could be involuntary.” 347 The underlying
analysis of this less demanding form of voluntariness emphasizes “‘run[ning] the
risks’ and ‘rais[ing] the chances’ of becoming a news item.” 348 Pursuant to such an
approach, as noted by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, “courts have classified
some people as limited purpose public figures because of their status, position or
associations.” 349 Such an approach is readily susceptible to the criticism that “[t]he
premise that public figures have voluntarily accepted the risk of defamation, or that
it goes with the territory, is nothing more than a handy fiction.” 350
Changes in technology and media make utilizing this form of analysis, which
lowers the bar for voluntariness, especially problematic. Professor Gerald
Ashdown has observed,
[i]n our highly mobile, visible, and interactive society, the risk of
attracting the attention of the press is as apparent as it is unpredictable.
342

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1979).
344
Id. (emphasis added).
345
Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting
Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440, 445 (S.D. Ga. 1976)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
346
McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 949 (3d Cir. 1985).
347
Hopkins, supra note 217, at 24.
348
King, supra note 6, at 692 (alterations in original) (quoting Clyburn v. News
World Commc’ns, Inc., 903 F.2d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
349
Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1083 (3d Cir.
1985).
350
King, supra note 6, at 698.
343
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Becoming involved in any number of events, whether voluntarily or
involuntarily, e.g., from an accident, natural disaster to a winning lottery
ticket (i.e., good luck or bad), makes us vulnerable to media exposure. 351
Accordingly, voluntariness is no longer confined to individuals who thrust
themselves into the vortex of a public controversy to try to influence the resolution
of the matter in controversy. 352 Instead voluntariness can be satisfied by a less
351

Gerald G. Ashdown, Journalism Police, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 739, 757 (2006).
See, e.g., McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 949 (3d Cir. 1985); Marcone,
754 F.2d at 1083; Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir.
1979); Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1978); see also, e.g.,
Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 350 F.3d 1272, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Because Lohrenz’s evidence
shows that she chose the F-14 combat jet while well aware of the public controversy over
women in combat roles, her challenge to the ruling that she was a voluntary limitedpurpose public figure once the Navy assigned her to the F-14 combat aircraft rings hollow:
she chose combat training in the F-14 and when, as a result of that choice, she became one
of the first two women combat pilots, a central role in the public controversy came with the
territory. Having assumed the risk when she chose combat jets that she would in fact
receive a combat assignment, Lt. Lohrenz attained a position of special prominence in the
controversy when she ‘suited up’ as an F-14 combat pilot.”); Clyburn v. News World
Commc’ns, Inc., 903 F.2d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Clyburn’s acts before any controversy
arose put him at its center. His consulting firm had numerous contracts with the District
government, he had many social contacts with administration officials, and Medina, at least
as one may judge from attendance at her funeral, also enjoyed such ties. Clyburn also spent
the night of Medina’s collapse in her company. One may hobnob with high officials
without becoming a public figure, but one who does so runs the risk that personal tragedies
that for less well-connected people would pass unnoticed may place him at the heart of a
public controversy. Clyburn engaged in conduct that he knew markedly raised the chances
that he would become embroiled in a public controversy. This conduct, together with his
false statements at the controversy’s outset, disable him from claiming the protections of a
purely ‘private’ person.”); Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 724 P.2d 562, 570−71
(Ariz. 1986) (“Dombey sought, received, accepted and struggled to keep appointments as
the designated insurance agent of record for a large county and administrator of deferred
compensation programs for its employees. While he was not employed by and received no
direct benefits from the public body, he did receive significant and valuable benefits
because of his position. He did more than compile and transmit research results or publish
arcana in obscure learned journals; he made recommendations resulting in substantial
expenditures from the public fisc for health and life insurance programs and of private
funds obtained by payroll deductions from public employees for the deferred compensation
program. By assuming the position that he held, Dombey invited public scrutiny and
should have expected that the manner in which he performed his duties would be a
legitimate matter of public concern, exposing him to public and media attention. This is not
to say that every provider of goods and services to the government becomes a public figure.
We believe that no bright line can be drawn. A person who sells legal pads to the judicial
department may legitimately expect to retain almost complete anonymity. Those
responsible for providing rockets for the space program may not legitimately enjoy the
same expectations. Dombey is at neither pole, but we believe that by assuming the
positions of agent of record and administrator for the deferred compensation plans, he
352
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demanding showing that plaintiffs willingly engaged in activity that foreseeably
put them at risk of public attention. Part of the pressure resulting in lowering the
bar of what constitutes voluntariness arises from courts avoiding the involuntary
public figure category. 353 Instead of developing the involuntary public figure
category, courts have repeatedly stretched their understanding of what constitutes
voluntariness to such an extent that they create what Professor Joseph King has
termed “stealth involuntary public figure[s].” 354
E. Devolving of the Private Individual
First in his plurality opinion in Rosenbloom and subsequently in his dissenting
opinion in Gertz, Justice Brennan observed that “[v]oluntarily or not, we are all
‘public’ men to some degree.” 355 Justice Brennan did not find agreement from a
sufficient number of his colleagues to form a majority around this conclusion.
David Lat, founder of the website Above the Law, and Professor Zach Shemtob
have argued that “Justice Brennan’s words ring even more true in the digital
age.” 356
Private individuals are certainly less private today than they were in 1974.
And for that, as Cassius proclaims to Brutus in William Shakespeare’s Julius
Caesar, “[t]he fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars. But in ourselves.” 357 Judge
Alex Kozinski has raised a steady drumbeat for the proposition that the ordinary
person’s love affair with technology is killing privacy: 358
It started with the supermarket loyalty programs. They seemed
innocuous enough—you just scribble down your name, number and
address in exchange for a plastic card and a discount on Oreos. . . .
. . . Letting stores track our purchases may not appear to be
permitting an intensely personal revelation but, as the saying goes, you

surrendered any legitimate expectation of anonymity with regard to the manner in which he
performed in his positions, his relationship with executives of the governmental agencies
and the other matters with which the articles were concerned. . . . Whatever requirement
there might be to ‘thrust’ oneself into a public controversy was satisfied by his voluntary
participation in activity calculated to lead to public scrutiny.” (citations omitted)).
353
See King, supra note 6, at 688–93.
354
Id. at 688.
355
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 364 (1974).
356
Lat & Shemtob, supra note 299, at 413.
357
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2, ll. 141−42, at 172 (David
Daniell ed., 1998).
358
See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Eric S. Nguyen, Has Technology Killed the Fourth
Amendment?, 2011–2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 15, 15; Alex Kozinski & Stephanie Grace,
Pulling Plug on Privacy: How Technology Helped Make the 4th Amendment Obsolete, THE
DAILY (June 22, 2011), available at http://www.law.utah.edu/wp-content/uploads/Week
Twelve-Pulling.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4NKT-GDK4.
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are what you eat, and we inevitably reveal more than we thought. Have
diapers in your cart? You probably have a baby. Tofu? Probably a
vegetarian. A case of Muscatel a week? An alcoholic (with poor taste, at
that). The cards also track the “where” and “when” of our shopping
expeditions. Making a late-night run to a convenience store near your exgirlfriend’s house? Buying posters and markers the day before a political
rally? If you swiped your card, all that information is now public. . . .
. . . These cards were just the beginning. Fast Track passes quickly
followed—with their lure of a shorter commute for a little privacy. Then
came eBay and Amazon, which save us from retyping our billing and
shipping information, if only we create an account. Before long,
convenience became paramount, and electronic tracking became the
norm. Nowadays, Google not only collects data on what websites we
visit but uses its satellites to take pictures of our homes. 359
Additionally, much of what was formerly squirreled away in a government records
office is now readily available online. 360 For instance, a nosy neighbor can
discover how much one paid for their home in only a moment on Zillow. 361 A little
more work and arrest records, professional licenses, property liens, trademarks,
patents, driver’s license information, and bankruptcy history, among other things,
are all readily available. 362
Social media reduces the private sphere even further. In 2008, the editors of
Webster’s New World Dictionary chose “overshare,” which they defined as “to
divulge excessive personal information,” as their word of the year. 363 There exists
a common and pronounced tendency to overshare on social media. 364 Professor
Bruce Boyden has observed that “[t]oo many people, confronted with the ability to
share information with others via social networks, readily avail themselves of that
opportunity, causing personal information to be shared from Facebook or Twitter
359

Kozinski & Grace, supra note 358, at 15.
HERMAN T. TAVANI, ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGY: ETHICAL ISSUES IN AN AGE OF
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 138 (2004).
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David Carlson, How Zillow Fueled My Real Estate Obsession, YOUNG ADULT
MONEY (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.youngadultmoney.com/2012/10/15/how-zillow-fueled
-my-real-estate-obsession/, archived at http://perma.cc/AY66-P62A (noting that “[m]uch to
the shock of some people that the price they paid for their home is on public record, Zillow
aggregates this public record data and makes it easy to see what a home was sold for in the
past.”).
362
How to Find Free Public Records Online, ABOUT.COM, http://websearch.about.
com/od/governmentpubliclegal/, archived at http://perma.cc/42SS-T44U (last visited Aug.
15, 2014).
363
Word of the Year 2008: Overshare, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD WORD OF THE YEAR
(Dec. 1, 2008, 6:31 AM), http://wordoftheyear.wordpress.com/2008/12/01/2008-word-of-t
he-year-overshare/, archived at http://perma.cc/GDQ7-NY8P.
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See Jennifer Rowsell, My Life on Facebook: Assessing the Art of Online Social
Networking, in ASSESSING NEW LITERACIES: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE CLASSROOM 95, 97–
98 (Anne Burke & Roberta F. Hammett eds., 2009).
360

2014]

LOST INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE

999

accounts with little care as to its relevance or privacy.” 365 Through social media,
ordinary individuals increasingly document almost every aspect of their lives. 366
Neuroscience analysis helps to explain some of this oversharing, suggesting that
disclosure itself, especially personal self-disclosure, functions as an intrinsic
reward, stimulating regions of the brain associated therewith. 367 Communications
and media studies scholars also have observed that computer-mediated
communication eliminates social and biological cues that would signal restraint
and instead make the Internet not “feel public to its users” thereby fostering less
restricted communication. 368 Seeking to restrain this epidemic of oversharing, a
cottage industry of writers caution against oversharing 369 and offer advice on
where to draw the line. 370
Nevertheless, oversharing has arguably become a new socially accepted norm
in which the non-over-sharer is the outlier. 371 Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has
argued that open sharing of information, not preservation of traditional privacy, is
the new social norm. 372 It is difficult to argue with the conclusion that there has
been a radical redefinition of social norms at least insofar as people “are freely
giving up some of their privacy to strangers, as they willingly friend strangers and
365

Bruce E. Boyden, Oversharing: Facebook Discovery and the Unbearable
Sameness of Internet Law, 65 ARK. L. REV. 39, 39 (2012).
366
Id. at 40.
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See Diana I. Tamir & Jason P. Mitchell, Disclosing Information about the Self is
Intrinsically Rewarding, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM., May 22, 2012, at 8038, 8038.
368
Malin Sveningsson Elm et al., Question 3: How Do Various Notions of Privacy
Influence Decisions in Qualitative Internet Research?, in INTERNET INQUIRY:
CONVERSATIONS ABOUT METHOD 69, 77 (Annette N. Markham & Nancy K. Baym eds.,
2009) (emphasis omitted).
369
See, e.g., Andy O’Donnell, The Dangers of Facebook Oversharing, ABOUT.COM
http://netsecurity.about.com/od/securityadvisorie1/a/The-Dangers-Of-Facebook-Oversharin
g.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/H3U8-8746 (last visited Aug. 15, 2014) (noting the
value of oversharing to stalkers and lawyers); Robert Siciliano, Oversharing on Social
Media Common Amongst 50+, MCAFEE BLOG CENTRAL (Oct. 23, 2013), http://blogs.mcaf
ee.com/consumer/50plus-tech-savvy-but-still-at-risk, archived at http://perma.cc/UT4FPJRD.
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Before You Wreck Yourself (Online), CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 31, 2013), http://articles.chicagotrib
une.com/2013-01-31/features/ct-tribu-social-media-oversharing-20130131_1_social-media
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Harrington & Lisa Endlich Heffernan, Oversharing: Why Do We Do It and How Do We
Stop?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2013, 1:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/grownand-flown/oversharing-why-do-we-do-it-and-how-do-we-stop_b_4378997.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/DEF2-3LWM.
371
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(2013).
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post information and images they would never have shared so publicly before.” 373
In selecting “overshare” as their word of the year, Websters’s editors were quite
conscious of this duality:
It’s also a word that is rather slip-slippery, chameleon-like. Some
people use it disparagingly; they don’t like oversharing. Others think
oversharing is good and that one must give full disclosure of one’s inner
life. Sometimes there is a generational shift in the way people look at this
practice and therefore view the word. 374
Even if an individual is cautious about sharing information online, a friend, a
parent, an acquaintance, a neighbor, or any other person one interacts with may be
far less hesitant about sharing or oversharing what formerly would have been
private information about another person. 375 And in this new era of social media,
“friend” is a far more expansive concept and less-known commodity, a problem
only magnified by unfathomable expansion online of the concept of a “friend of a
friend.” 376
Furthermore, even among the most active and adept users of technology, there
is little understanding of what is being made publicly available through their online
activities. 377 Such lack of knowledge, or at least full appreciation thereof, can
result in even classically private information such as what one is reading becoming
exposed through Internet connectivity programs such as Facebook’s social
reader. 378
Technology poses an even greater threat by taking pieces of information and
enabling aggregation of massive amounts of data about formerly private
individuals that can then be made readily accessible.379 “[W]ith the advent of more
373

Laurie Thomas Lee, Privacy and Social Media, in THE SOCIAL MEDIA INDUSTRIES
146, 150 (Alan B. Albarran ed., 2013).
374
Word of the Year 2008: Overshare, supra note 363.
375
FREDERICK S. LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY: THE 400-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR MOST
CONTESTED RIGHT 255−61 (2009).
376
See generally DOUGLAS JACOBSON & JOSEPH IDZIOREK, COMPUTER SECURITY
LITERACY: STAYING SAFE IN A DIGITAL WORLD 214–17 (2012) (discussing the concept of
“friend” in the digital world as it relates to varying levels of access to private information).
377
See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 66–68 (2008).
378
Margot Kaminski, Reading Over Your Shoulder: Social Readers and Privacy Law,
2 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 13, 13 (2012). “Websites are adopting techniques to glean
information about visitors to their sites, in real time, and then deliver different versions of
the Web to different people.” Jennifer Valentino-DeVries et al., Websites Vary Prices,
Deals Based on Users’ Information, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2012), http://online.
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534, archived at
http://perma.cc/4NKQ-D367. Websites’ prices and text displays vary to respond to the
customer’s IP address, search history, and means of accessing the site. Id.
379
LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID: SOCIAL
NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 118−19 (2012); Craig Blakeley & Jeff Matsuura,
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powerful data mining techniques, the aggregation of seemingly innocuous personal
data across a range of social media makes it fairly straightforward to put together a
disturbingly detailed profile of the data’s originator.” 380 The access to information
through aggregation and data mining is fundamentally undermining what was
formerly the private sphere. 381 Sun Microsystems Chief Executive Officer Scott
McNealy indelicately declared: “You have zero privacy. Get over it.” 382 At the
very least, technology and people’s use of that technology has resulted in private
individuals in 2014 being significantly less private than they were in 1974.
IV. GERTZ’S ENDURING PURPOSES
While the sandcastle of Gertz has been battered by waves of First Amendment
pressures and technological changes, it still stands, not yet having been subsumed
back into the earth. While the edifice may someday be fully washed away, that day
has not yet arrived. Gertz still serves important purposes, especially with regard to
protecting the interests of private individuals harmed by media coverage.

Welcome to the World of Information Aggregation, LEGAL SOLUTIONS BLOG (Feb. 13,
2012), http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-and-techology/welcome-to-the-w
orld-of-information-aggregation/, archived at http://perma.cc/EC3G-N6AL; Andre Oboler
et al., The Danger of Big Data: Social Media as Computational Social Science, FIRST
MONDAY (July 2, 2012), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3993/3269,
archived at http://perma.cc/P9JS-K6UD.
380
Lynne Y. Williams, Who is the ‘Virtual’ You and Do You Know Who is Watching
You?, in SOCIAL MEDIA FOR ACADEMICS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 175, 177–78 (Diane
Rasmussen Neal ed., 2012).
381
See Saby Ghoshray, The Emerging Reality of Social Media: Erosion of Individual
Privacy Through Cyber-Vetting and Law’s Inability to Catch Up, 12 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 551, 556–65 (2013). Reflecting upon the new realities, a New York state
court observed:
[W]hen Plaintiff created her Facebook and MySpace accounts, she consented to
the fact that her personal information would be shared with others,
notwithstanding her privacy settings. Indeed, that is the very nature and purpose
of these social networking sites else they would cease to exist. Since Plaintiff
knew that her information may become publicly available, she cannot now claim
that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy. As recently set forth by
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, given the millions
of users, “[i]n this environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable
expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful
thinking.”
Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (citation omitted).
382
Deborah Radcliff, A Cry for Privacy: As E-Commerce Grows, Businesses Must
Avoid Intruding on the Lives of Customers — Or Risk Losing Them, COMPUTERWORLD,
May 17, 1999, at 46.
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Under First Amendment pressure, it becomes easy to think a plaintiff simply
needs to “toughen up” or have “thicker skin.” 383 Thinking this way can
inappropriately diminish appreciation for the seriousness of the injury. 384 As
observed by Justice Stewart, “[t]he right of a [person] to the protection of his own
reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being.” 385 Nor is
this some transitory right of recent vintage:
There is no doubt about the historical fact that the interest in one’s good
name was considered an important interest requiring legal protection
more than a thousand years ago; and that so far as Anglo-Saxon history
is concerned this interest became a legally protected interest
comparatively soon after the interest in bodily integrity was given legal
protection. 386
Though there are variances in legal schemes for addressing injury from
defamation, there is a cross-cultural recognition of the injury and need for
redress. 387 As Professor Anita Bernstein observed, “[m]any belief systems and
ideologies that otherwise clash with one another—religious doctrines, secular
humanism, and psychological, philosophical, sociological, and anthropological
understandings—unite around dignity as central to human life in a society. Dignity
encompasses reputation, the center of defamation.” 388 Simply stated, “publication
of untruths about people can hurt those people, often quite severely.” 389 Tort
damages arising from defamation include compensation for out-of-pocket financial
losses incurred by the plaintiff, harm suffered to plaintiff’s reputation and standing
in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish. 390 Redress of
defamation injuries is in accord with traditional and broadly accepted principles
undergirding tort law. 391

383

See, e.g., Shulman v. Hunderfund, 905 N.E.2d 1159, 1163 (N.Y. 2009) (noting the
need for a public figure defamation plaintiff “to develop a thicker skin”).
384
See Amy Kristin Sanders & Natalie Christine Olsen, Re-Defining Defamation:
Psychological Sense of Community in the Age of the Internet, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 355,
363 (2012).
385
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966).
386
LAURENCE H. ELDRIDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 53, at 293–94 (1978).
387
See DIANE ROWLAND & ELIZABETH MACDONALD, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
LAW 393–94 (3d ed. 2005).
388
Anita Bernstein, Real Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1457, 1462
(2012).
389
Schauer, supra note 138, at 912.
390
Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of
Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 584 (2001).
391
Stanley Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65 VA. L.
REV. 785, 791–92 (1979).

2014]

LOST INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE

1003

Injury prevention by restraining speakers who make statements that may
injure the reputation of others also stands as one of the core purposes of
defamation actions. 392 The purpose of the actual malice standard is to loosen
restraints to allow for a robust flow of debate and discussion. Loosening restraints
is not, however, always a good thing for the individual or the broader society.
“[U]nfortunately for those defamed, you cannot unring a bell.” 393 Where injury has
been done to a person’s reputation, the person cannot be returned to the same place
of good standing within the community. 394 The internet only magnifies the
problem by bringing into effect a propagandist’s vision of telling a lie enough
times to make it indelibly fixed as the truth. 395 Even professional service
companies, like Reputation.com, discussed above, have limits on their capacity for
removing harmful untruthful information from the internet, 396 and accessing the
services of these companies is “expensive and beyond the means of many
victims.” 397
Furthermore, lesser restraint through the application of the actual malice
standard threatens to lead to increased media errors, which reduce public
confidence and injure the media’s role as a watchdog. 398 The proliferation of
untrue statements, which is generally deemed low-value speech, 399 not only floods
392

Id. at 792.
Salil K. Mehra, Post a Message and Go to Jail: Criminalizing Internet Libel in
Japan and the United States, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 801 (2007).
394
See, e.g., Connor v. Scroggs, 821 So. 2d 542, 552 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that
“[a]ccusing a person of [sexual molestation of a child] without cause is equally horrendous
[as the actual crime] in light of the public humiliation such an allegation would cause the
accused person”); Blatnik v. Avery Dennison Corp., 774 N.E.2d 282, 293 (Ohio Ct. App.
2002) (upholding a defamation jury award because “[a] man’s reputation is ruined when he
is publicly labeled as one who cannot be trusted around women in the workplace”).
395
See generally THOMAS PRESTON, PANDORA’S TRAP: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION
MAKING AND BLAME AVOIDANCE IN VIETNAM AND IRAQ 84 (2011) (describing the
political tactic of “staying on message and repeating a charge (regardless of the evidence)
[as] an age old tactic” that when “[r]epeated enough times . . . becomes engrained in the
public mind, easily recalled and difficult to remove”).
396
See Michael L. Rustad, Twenty-First-Century Tort Theories: The Internalist/
Externalist Debate, 88 IND. L.J. 419, 430 (2013) (“Even with the help of companies . . .
that will attempt to expunge tortious postings, you cannot really ‘unring the bell’ once
information is posted, copied, and forwarded around the globe.”).
397
Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 105 (2009).
398
See ROY L. MOORE & MICHAEL D. MURRAY, MEDIA LAW AND ETHICS 112–19 (3d
ed. 2008) (describing the media’s important role as a “watchdog” in society, government,
and democracy); WYNFORD HICKS, WRITING FOR JOURNALISTS 14 (1999); Joseph Jerome,
Media Behavior Erodes Public Confidence, Undermines Press Clause Purpose, AM.
CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (July 26, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/media-behavior-erode
s-public-confidence-undermines-press-clause-purpose, archived at http://perma.cc/6D2KDKA3.
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See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 271
(2004) (observing that “false statements of fact are not the sort of expression the First
Amendment was meant to promote”).
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the marketplace of ideas with inaccurate information but also undermines public
confidence in ascertaining truth. 400 Journalist Farhad Manjoo has addressed this
latter point in an intriguing book that explores the extraordinary divide over facts,
not policy, that have become broken down as a point of consensus and are simply
treated as another perspective or rejected as untrue, despite their validity. 401
Additionally, while ordinary people are now empowered to communicate with
mass audiences in a manner that would have been inconceivable for members of
the Gertz Court four decades ago, there remains a divide between the “private
individual” and the “public figure” in the extent of their access to audiences. 402
Simply stated, “traditional political, economic, cultural, and media elites are also
using—and in many ways still dominating—the Internet.” 403 While the
communication reach of private individuals has increased extraordinarily, there are
serious questions about the breadth of the audience an ordinary person can
reach. 404 As David Lat and Zach Shemtob have asserted, “even in the digital age,
famous celebrities still have greater access to communication channels than
ordinary citizens.” 405 Accordingly, a substantial divide remains between the extent
to which private individuals and public figures can effectively rely on self-help to
remedy injuries to their reputations.
Also, the Gertz assumption of the risk voluntariness rationale has lingering
resonance. Professor Susan Gilles has drawn a set of intriguing comparisons
between the Gertz Court’s voluntariness analysis and traditional tort law concepts
of primary and secondary assumption of the risk. Primary assumption of the risk,
as distinct from secondary assumption of the risk, “does not require proof of either
subjective knowledge and appreciation of the risk by the plaintiff or actual consent
400

See Karl S. Coplan, Climate Change, Political Truth, and the Marketplace of
Ideas, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 545, 545–46, 550, 559. See generally CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2486 (2d ed. 2011) (“Lying is destructive of society; it undermines
trust among men and tears apart the fabric of social relationships.”).
401
See generally FARHAD MANJOO, TRUE ENOUGH: LEARNING TO LIVE IN A POSTFACT SOCIETY 1–2, 19–23 (2008) (discussing the complexities that underlie the
counterintuitive paradox that for many people, facts matter less in the digital age).
402
See generally MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 38–40,
54–57 (2009) (noting that “communities of Web sites on different political topics are each
dominated by a small set of highly successful sites,” which limits the public’s access to
information).
403
ANDREA L. PRESS & BRUCE A. WILLIAMS, THE NEW MEDIA ENVIRONMENT: AN
INTRODUCTION 21 (2010).
404
See generally HINDMAN, supra note 402, at 54–57 (highlighting that “blogs almost
immediately replicated the winners-take-all distribution of links and traffic that we see in
the Web as a whole”).
405
Lat & Shemtob, supra note 299, at 411; Patrick H. Hunt, Comment, Tortious
Tweets: A Practical Guide to Applying Traditional Defamation Law to Twibel Claims, 73
LA. L. REV. 559, 582 (2013) (“To say that all Twitter users do not have an equal voice on
the website is an understatement. . . . An average user would likely be hard-pressed to
effectively rebut a defamatory statement posted by a user with a larger than average
number of followers.” (citation omitted)).
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to that risk; merely engaging in the activity is sufficient to trigger assumption.” 406
With regard to primary assumption of the risk, even in the absence of
individualized knowledge of the risk, persons engaging in certain activities accept
certain risks, such as a spectator or ticketholder being hit by a foul ball at a
baseball game. 407 Alternatively, secondary assumption of the risk is focused upon
the individual’s knowledge of and voluntary agreement to submit to the risk. 408 For
example, a person accepting a ride from a driver the person knows to be heavily
intoxicated. 409
Insofar as voluntariness intersects with the primary assumption of the risk
category, “[t]he Supreme Court seems to suggest that just as baseball has inherent
dangers [that should be] apparent to all, so does public life. Those who seek a role
of prominence in society can be deemed to agree to the inherent risks of that
‘sport,’ the danger of false reports.” 410 As for the secondary assumption of the risk
category, Professor Gilles contends that the Court’s understanding of limitedpurpose public figure that places herself in the vortex of a public controversy
draws a close, though not exact fit, with a subjectively knowledgeable plaintiff
who embraces a known risk. 411 The private individual, however, has neither taken
a position that is inherently subject to media attention (primary assumption of the
risk) nor entered into a particular controversy knowing the specific attendant
dangers of attention (secondary assumption of the risk). To the contrary, under
neither formulation has a private individual assumed the risk. Instead she is having
the imposition thrust upon her. Similarly, Professor Smolla has observed that
“[t]he public figure doctrine is heavily grounded in cultural and moral equity—if
you can’t stand the heat of the fire, stay out of the kitchen.”412 The private
individual neither intended to go into the kitchen nor knew that she was even there.
V. THE LOST INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE
While a number of commentators have argued for a restoration of Justice
Brennan’s Rosenbloom plurality test as the proper constitutional rubric for
defamation cases,413 there are compromises short of that approach that can strike a
406

Gilles, supra note 1, at 236.
Id.
408
Id. at 235.
409
Id.
410
Id. at 247.
411
Id. at 260–62.
412
SMOLLA, supra note 213, § 6:40, at 6-370.
413
Strong arguments have been offered in support of this position. See, e.g., Peter J.
Hageman, Rosenbloom: Its Time Has Come Again, 17 COMM. L. 9, 9–13 (1999); Lat &
Shemtob, supra note 299, at 404; Douglas B. McKechnie, The Death of the Public Figure
Doctrine: How the Internet and the Westboro Baptist Church Spawned a Killer, 64
HASTINGS L.J. 469, 490–97 (2013); Howard M. Wasserman, Two Degrees of Speech
Protection: Free Speech Through the Prism of Agricultural Disparagement Laws, 8 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 323, 349 (2000).
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more equitable balance between the enduring purposes served by Gertz and the
First Amendment pressures that are pushing on the Gertz classification structure. A
significant component of properly accommodating these competing pressures is
found by clarifying the mysterious involuntary pubic figure category. To define
this category, it is useful to draw upon principles from an opinion in Rosenbloom,
though one considerably less heralded than Justice Brennan’s opinion: Justice
White’s concurrence.
Justice White offered a narrower expansion of constitutional constraints on
defamation actions than the plurality in Rosenbloom. Addressing WIP Radio’s
coverage of Philadelphia pornography distributor George Rosenbloom and his
interactions with law enforcement, Justice White advanced the following
understanding of why the media coverage should be protected by the actual malice
standard:
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan itself made clear that discussion of the
official actions of public servants such as the police is constitutionally
privileged. “The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of
public officials” is, in the language of that case, “a fundamental principle
of the American form of government.” Discussion of the conduct of
public officials cannot, however, be subjected to artificial limitations
designed to protect others involved in an episode with officials from
unfavorable publicity. Such limitations would deprive the public of full
information about the official action that took place. In the present case,
for example, the public would learn nothing if publication only of the
fact that the police made an arrest were permitted; it is also necessary
that the grounds for the arrest and, in many circumstances, the identity of
the person arrested be stated. In short, it is rarely informative for
newspapers or broadcasters to state merely that officials acted unless
they also state the reasons for their action and the persons whom their
action affected.
Nor can New York Times be read as permitting publications that
invade the privacy or injure the reputations of officials, but forbidding
those that invade the privacy or injure the reputations of private citizens
against whom official action is directed. New York Times gives the
broadcasting media and the press the right not only to censure and
criticize officials but also to praise them and the concomitant right to
censure and criticize their adversaries. To extend constitutional
protection to criticism only of officials would be to authorize precisely
that sort of thought control that the First Amendment forbids government
to exercise.
I would accordingly hold that in defamation actions, absent actual
malice as defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the First
Amendment gives the press and the broadcast media a privilege to report
and comment upon the official actions of public servants in full detail,
with no requirement that the reputation or the privacy of an individual
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involved in or affected by the official action be spared from public
view. 414
Professors David Anderson and Laurence Tribe argue the Gertz Court’s
cryptic discussion of involuntary public figures is intended to encapsulate those
individuals qualifying under the rubric set forth in Justice White’s concurring
opinion in Rosenbloom. 415 Professor Anderson concluded that Gertz’s involuntary
public figure “is not much broader than the one suggested by Justice White in his
concurring opinion in Rosenbloom: ‘individual[s] involved in or affected by . . .
official action.’” 416 Similarly, Professor Tribe has observed that the involuntary
public figure category “appears to include persons who are involved in or directly
affected by the actions of public officials.” 417 Professor Tribe argued that
accordingly “the magazine distributor in the Rosenbloom case arrested by the
police for distributing obscene literature would be an involuntary public figure
with respect to reports or comments about the arrest.” 418 Not only does Justice
White’s concurrence present a viable contender for bringing meaning to the Gertz
Court’s fleeting and cryptic reference to involuntary public figures, it also provides
a useful cornerstone for constructing this category in light of four decades of postGertz societal and jurisprudential evolution.
Drawing on Justice White’s concurrence and considering the issue from a
normative perspective, courts should distinguish an involuntary public figure from
a private individual using the following rubric. An otherwise private individual
will be treated as an involuntary public figure to the extent that the individual is
integrally intertwined with addressing the following:
(1) the official conduct or qualifications for office of a public official,
(2) the actions of a public figure with regard to a matter of public
concern, or
(3) a matter of public concern itself.
The Merriam-Webster’s definition of integral—“important and necessary” or
“essential to completeness” 419—is incorporated herein.
As for the first species of involuntary public figures—those who are integrally
intertwined with addressing the official conduct or qualifications for office of a
public official—Justice White quite properly observed that “[d]iscussion of the
414

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 61–62 (1971) (White, J.,
concurring) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964)).
415
TRIBE, supra note 236, at 880; David A. Anderson, Libel and Press SelfCensorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 450–451 (1975).
416
Anderson, supra note 415, at 451 (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 62 (White, J.,
concurring)).
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TRIBE, supra note 236, at 880.
418
Id. (citation omitted).
419
Integral, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/integr
al, archived at http://perma.cc/F6A2-UGTM (last visited Aug. 18, 2014).
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conduct of public officials cannot . . . be subjected to artificial limitations designed
to protect others involved in an episode with officials from unfavorable publicity.
Such limitations would deprive the public of full information about the official
action that took place.” 420 A contrary resolution would undermine the fundamental
animating principle that launched the Supreme Court’s recognition of
constitutional limitations upon defamation actions in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. At its core, the New York Times decision serves to protect the ability of
the people and press to discuss the actions of public officials so as to engage in
self-governance. The entwinement of a private person in the official conduct of a
public official cannot function as a shield for reports about the conduct of a public
official. 421 Because enabling democratic self-governance stands as the core

420

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 61 (1971) (White, J., concurring).
A Tennessee Court of Appeals decision in Lewis v. NewsChannel 5 Network, L.P.,
238 S.W.3d 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), is illustrative of this approach:
421

The undisputed facts in this case establish as a matter of law that Brad
Lewis should be deemed to be a public figure for the purpose of NewsChannel
5’s report regarding Major Dollarhide’s official misconduct. He is, to be sure, an
involuntary public figure because he did not purposely inject himself into the
forefront of the controversy surrounding Major Dollarhide. However, the
NewsChannel 5 defendants had the right to report on Major Dollarhide’s
disempowerment and on the reasons why the Chief of Police decided to relieve
him of his duties. This right necessarily included reporting on the circumstances
surrounding Major Dollarhide’s intervention to prevent Brad Lewis from being
arrested on December 27, 1998. Without these facts, the public would not have
been fully and appropriately informed of the seriousness of Major Dollarhide’s
misconduct.
Had the facts that Brad Lewis believes to be libelous been removed from
the NewsChannel 5 story, the public would have been left to speculate about the
reasons for the Chief of Police’s actions. The public would only have been
informed that Major Dollarhide had gone to the scene of an incident where a
person was being detained and that he had secured the release of that individual.
Based on this information alone, the public would have no way of assessing
what Major Dollarhide’s motivation had been or whether Major Dollarhide was
being disempowered for an adequate or inadequate reason. Even if the public
had assumed that Major Dollarhide had acted improperly in some way, it would
have no way of ascertaining how serious his misconduct was.
The fact that Brad Lewis was the person involved in the incident that led to
Major Dollarhide’s disempowerment sheds significant light on Major
Dollarhide’s conduct. The fact that Brad Lewis allegedly had firearms, betting
slips, and a large amount of cash in his possession when he was detained
dramatically emphasizes the seriousness of Major Dollarhide’s misconduct.
These facts removed ambiguity from the story. They informed the public that
Major Dollarhide had intervened to prevent a family member from being
arrested for serious criminal offenses. By reporting these facts, the
NewsChannel 5 defendants enabled the public to better understand Major
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purpose for protecting freedom of speech, the weight on Gertz’s balancing between
the state’s interests in protecting a private individual against injury from
defamation and the need of a robust and vigorous press are most pronounced in
favor of application of the actual malice standard with regard to the species of
involuntary public figures who have become intertwined with public officials.
Involuntary public figures are not, however, limited to this variety.
First Amendment purposes extending beyond self-governance point toward
recognition of a second species of involuntary public figures, those who are
integrally intertwined with addressing the actions of a public figure regarding a
matter of public concern. The entwinement of a private person with a public figure
on a matter of public concern cannot function as a shield for reports about a public
figure as to matters of public concern any more than it can as to a public official. 422
As a practical matter, litigation in such cases appears to regularly involve closely
related family members or those involved in romantic relationships with allpurpose public figures. 423 There is, however, conceptually no reason to limit this
species of involuntary public figure to family members of or those involved in
romantic relationships with all-purpose public figures. While strong arguments can
be made for distinguishing public officials from public figures, 424 the important
First Amendment purposes served beyond the political sphere point toward
embracing this application. Failure to apply the actual malice standard in cases
wherein private individuals are integrally intertwined with addressing the actions
of a public figure regarding a matter of public concern would inhibit the press in
reporting on the actions of public figures with regard to matters of public concern.
The First Amendment importance of reporting the matter is not diminished by the
entwinement of the private person with the public figure and, as reflected in the
discussion above, the rationale for dividing private persons from public figures has
been diminished. Accordingly, the scale tips, though the question is a closer one
Dollarhide’s corrupt motivation, as well as the seriousness of his breach of his
official duty.
Id. at 299–300.
422
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238
(5th Cir. 1980), is illustrative of this approach. Therein, Anita Brewer, who was at one time
Elvis Presley’s “number one girlfriend,” and her husband, Joe Brewer, were referenced in
media reports about Elvis Presley following the dissolution of his marriage to Priscilla
Presley. Id. at 1257–58. The references involved Brewer’s earlier relationship with Elvis.
Id. The Court concluded that Brewer had actually become a limited-purpose public figure
for purposes of her connection with Elvis and that neither she nor her husband would be
treated as private individuals. Id.
423
See generally Mark P. Strasser, A Family Affair? Domestic Relations and
Involuntary Public Figure Status, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 69, 100 (2013) (noting that
“[s]everal cases suggest that family status alone may be enough to make one an involuntary
public figure”).
424
See generally Schauer, supra note 138, at 905–35 (arguing important differences
exist between public officials and public figures that warrant applying a higher level of
constitutional protection to speech regarding public officials than public figures).
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than with public officials, in favor of application of the actual malice standard in
cases involving otherwise private individuals who are integrally intertwined with
addressing the actions of a public figure regarding a matter of public concern.
The third species of involuntary public figures, those integrally intertwined
with addressing a matter of public concern itself, is the application in which there
is the greatest susceptibility of the Gertz structure collapsing and an implicit
restoration of the Rosenbloom test occurring. However, that result need not follow,
and in fact an appropriate recognition of this variety of involuntary public figure
will reduce First Amendment pressures upon courts to define voluntariness in a
questionable manner. In other words, instead of expanding the definition of
voluntariness until it becomes almost unrecognizable, courts can instead return
voluntariness to a more reasonable interpretation of the concept while developing
the involuntary public figure category.
Three cases are particularly helpful in illustrating this species of involuntary
public figure: (1) Wiegel v. Capital Times Co., 425 (2) Dameron v. Washington
Magazine, Inc., 426 and (3) Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell. 427 In Wiegel, the
plaintiff, Joseph Wiegel, declined to exercise soil-erosion-prevention measures that
had been recommended but not required by government officials, resulting in more
than $100,000 in cleanup costs for taxpayers to rehabilitate waterways bordering
his farm. 428 A local newspaper, The Capital Times, covered Wiegel’s disinclination
to put into place a soil erosion plan and the adverse consequences thereof.429 The
Capital Times advocated for increased restrictions to be imposed upon Wiegel to
prevent this continuing injury to the public coffers and the environment. 430
The plaintiff in Dameron, Merle Dameron, worked as an air traffic controller
and had been the only air traffic controller on duty when a plane crashed coming
into Dulles Airport in 1974. 431 Following a plane crash at Dulles in 1982, the
Washingtonian magazine ran a story about the accident and addressed airline
safety issues, especially those related to Dulles. 432 Relying upon a National
Transportation Safety Board report, the author of the story observed that
significant strides had been made in improving airline safety including air traffic
control improvements, but that more should be done, noting three accidents that
were partly attributable to air traffic controllers. 433 The author did not list the
controllers by name but did list the three accidents. 434
The last case, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, involved Centennial Olympic
Park security guard Richard Jewell and media reports regarding the Federal Bureau
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of Investigation’s turning the focus of its investigation to Jewell as a suspected
bomber in an act of domestic terrorism perpetrated at the 1996 Atlanta
Olympics. 435 In each of these cases, a private individual was integrally intertwined
with addressing a matter of public concern.
Caution in application of this category is, however, warranted. Courts should
not apply the involuntary public figure designation where the private individual’s
involvement in the matter of public concern was only tangential or trivial 436 or
where the private individual is simply someone who is “illustrative of some
perceived social ill.” 437 Under such circumstances, the would-be involuntary public
figure is not integral to addressing a matter of public concern. Instead, private
individuals remain primarily undifferentiated from other private individuals, and
the matter can be addressed meaningfully without their inclusion. Exclusion of
reference to such persons is an inconvenience rather than a disabling limitation on
the media in addressing a matter of public concern where the private individual is
merely tangential, trivial, or simply being used in a representative capacity. That
inconvenience does not override the continuing value served by the Gertz
framework.
VI. CONCLUSION
Professor John C. P. Goldberg astutely observed that New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan “was about as easy to resolve as a landmark decision could be. But easy
cases are not easy in all respects. Precisely because their outcomes are
overdetermined, they pose the problem of how to decide subsequent cases, in
which all signs are not pointing toward one resolution.” 438 L. B. Sullivan and the
Alabama political establishment’s aggressive use of defamation law as a tool to
support the maintenance of white supremacy by striking at political adversaries in
the press and the civil rights movement brought to the surface the dangers posed by
defamation suits to democratic self-governance. It was, despite the dramatic
change in the centuries of precedent, as noted by Professor Goldberg, an easy case.
The Court in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts extended constitutional safeguards to
speech addressing public figures, which the Court conceived of in political terms.
In doing so though, the Supreme Court opened a door that state and lower-federal
courts walked through to employ the constitutional safeguards of the actual malice
standard to serve First Amendment purposes beyond the sphere of debate and
discussion regarding public policy. The Court, however, went too far in
Rosenbloom, not on the facts of the case but in terms of the legal standard adopted
by the plurality. The balance between safeguarding the press and safeguarding an
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injured private individual had become overly protective of the media and
insufficiently so of private individuals. The Gertz decision was a response to these
excesses of Rosenbloom. Gertz would prove, at least in the high court’s application
and understanding of its standards, to be an overcorrection.
Four decades of jurisprudential and societal change have brought enormous
pressure to bear on the Gertz framework. That pressure is being released in a
number of ways including a dramatically expanded notion of what constitutes
voluntariness. The structure itself is potentially in danger of collapse. That is
problematic insofar as there are important values that are served by Gertz in
safeguarding private individuals against the substantial harm that can be caused by
defamation.
The involuntary public figure category provides a release valve for some of
the pressures that have built up. Justice White perceived the Rosenbloom plurality
as over-reaching. Instead of the plurality’s giant leap, he offered in his concurrence
a more modest step forward. A workable framework for constructing an
involuntary public figure can be reestablished on the more modest step forward
identified by Justice White with some alterations to reflect jurisprudential and
societal changes. By finding the lost involuntary public figure, courts take a small
step forward to restoring doctrinal clarity with less danger of again swinging the
pendulum too far.

